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PREFACE 
This paper is a preliminary investigation of the "Christian 
Ethics" of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in terms of its self-consistency 
and sufficiency for moral guidance. As Christian, Bonhoefferts 
ethic serves as a concrete instance of the ways in which reli-
gious dogmas are both regulative and formative of human behavioro 
Accordingly, this paper will study (a) the internal consistency 
of the revealed data and structural principles within Bonhoef-
ferts system, and (b) the significance of biblical directives for 
moral decisionso The question of Bonhoefferfs "success," then, 
presents a double problem. First, one needs to test the intrin-
sic clarity of Bonhoeffer's relationship of the supernatural and 
natural orders o Secondly, one needs to consider the adequacy of 
his Christian ethics in terms of man's moral needs. 
In evaluating the ethical system of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, it 
is necessary to realize the incomplete and fragmentary character 
of many of his writings. Also to be noted is the absence of a 
definitive biography of his life. The estimation of Bonhoeffer's 
moral theory is complicated further by his many letters, notes 
and lectures. While the latter demonstrate the range and insight 
of his mind, their lack of systematic treatment makes it diffi-
cult to get any confident grasp of the author's meaning. 
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There is evidence of an ethical concern throughout all of 
Bonhoeffer's writings. However, Bonhoeffer attempted only one 
major work in the field of ethics, and this systematic effort was 
interrupted by his imprisonment in 1943. Nonetheless, this work 
was edited and published in 1949 in spite of its incomplete 
stage. Entitled Ethics, it must be interpreted in light of the 
complete corpus of Bonhoeffer's writings, as well as of that 
information about the author which can be derived from his famil 
and associates. In this manner, one can hope to comprehend Bon-
hoaffer's most mature statement on the character of Christian 
ethics. 
For easy reference, all quotations are taken from the 
English editions of Bonhoeffer's works. These translations are 
more accessible than the German compendium (Gesammelte Schriften, 
Vol. I-IV, Eberhard Bethge, ed., Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 
1958-1961)0 
I am grateful to Father Edward Maziarz, C.P.P.S., both for 
his advice and critical comments which have directed this thesis 
to its final form. Many problems of content and style were 
avoided by his careful judgment 0 My thanks also go to Mrs. 
George Connelly who proofread and typed the final draft. It goes 
without saying that they are not responsible for any defects that 
might remain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An enduring problem in the history of philosophy concerns 
the relationship between faith and reason. Different theological 
premises can cause different viewpoints about ontology, anthro-
pology and ethics. Ethical systems usually vary according to the 
theological positions which they implicitly or explicitly hold. 
Any information concerning the nature of man gained from Revela-
tion is therefore relevant for conceiving of man's specific 
happiness and the human activities necessary to its achievement. 
When Christianity serves as the context of the ethical dis-
cussion, the Fall of Man and the Incarnation are two pivotal 
doctrines that largely determine the place of reason in the for-
mulation of ideal behavior. The effects of the primordial sin 
condition the capacities and limitations of human nature. Again, 
the reality of the Incarnation affects human destiny, and it is 
possible, therefore, that the Redemption is operative in one's 
definition of human nature. For example, the traditional Catho-
lic doctrine on the results of Original Sin states that man's 
essential mode of being was merely modified. This dogma is con-
trary to the orthodox Calvinist view that man's nature was 
changed radically. Subsequently, because of various sectarian 
interpretations of scripture, a different status and validity 
1 
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is granted to rational and natural norms. Revelation is influen-
tial in one's ethics not only because the Bible contains moral 
directives but also because it is pertinent to the origins, 
nature and destiny of man. 
This paper assumes that morality is a problem of rational 
deliberation as well as of religious beliefs. The freedom of man 
to choose between possible modes of behavior and a sense of right 
and wrong to guide such choices are prerequisites for an "ethi-
cal" system. If these assumptions are not granted by the theolo-
gian, then morality becomes simply a matter of biblical exegesiso 
A proper coordination of moral theology and moral philosophy 
seems necessary for the concrete direction of one's life. There-
fore, theology and philosophy must remain open to mutual criti-
cism. Philosophy can clarify the notions of faith, illuminate 
the implications of revealed truth and provide theologians with 
a criterion for a viable terminologyo However, it can perform 
this function only in partnership with faith. If the theological 
elements of some moral theory are so privileged as to exclude 
rational analysis, then perhaps that theory is also beyond clari-
fication and development. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran theologian; his career 
was motivated by the attempt to expound the doctrines of Martin 
Luther. His work called Ethics was inspired by such theological 
concerns. The book is admirable as a logical and concrete appli-
cation of the Lutheran dogmas of Sin and Reconciliation to the 
roblems of 20th centur moral it • The current of 
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Bonhoeffer testifies to the honesty and insight of his analysis 
of the complexities of ethical decision, the nature of conscienc~ 
the social effects of ethical criteria and previous ethical 
theories. However, Ethics claims to be more than a theory of 
_oral theology; the author states that it is a critique of all 
ethical systems. "Christian EthiCS," in Bonhoeffer's opinion, 
invalidates all knowledge of good and evil. l He claims to have 
evidence about human nature that is not available to philosophi-
cal investigation and, moreover, which renders rational study 
useless. 
The validity of a philosophical analysis of Bonhoeffer's 
Christian ethic rests on the assumption that reason as well as 
faith is n~cessary for the proper orientation of life. Further-
.ore, Bonhoeffer's denial of a philosophical dimension in ethical 
considerations seems to lead to incongruities. In the first 
place, Bonhoeffer's rejection of any philosophical approach to 
~orality is itself a philosophical position and therefore open to 
rational rebuttal. Secondly, Bonhoeffer consciously utilizes 
Whilosophical (Kantian) argumentation to prove the bankruptcy 
of natural morality. As a result, it follows that Bonhoeffer's 
~istorical accuracy and epistemology are questionable. Thirdly, 
the meaning of Bonhoeffer's terminology is difficult. For in-
stance, what is the significance of the term "ethical lt in Bon-
~oefferfs system, since he considers unaided human nature inea-
lDietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bathge (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1955), p. 17. 
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pable of choosing the right course of action? Fourthly, his 
theology is admittedly Lutheran and surely not the only inter-
~retation of revelation that might be of consequence in moral 
theology. All of these reasons for applying philosophical cri-
teria to the ethics of Bonhoeffer are reducible to a basic pre-
supposition that faith and reason are interdependent in evaluat-
ing the quality of onets life. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to correctly understand 
Bonhoefferfs moral theory and recognize the originality and sen-
sitivity of his ethical proposals. Criticism is not the prime 
objective of this investigation. The chapters of this study will 
attempt, first, to determine the place of ethics within the con-
text of Bonhoeffer's life and thought (Chapter I). Then, Bon-
hoefferts definition of theology and philosophy and his notion 
of human existence will be discussed as the foundations of his 
ethical system (Chapter II). This paper will then turn to an 
examination and critique of Bonhoefferfs theory of a viable 
Christian ethic (Chapters III and IV). Only if these areas are 
researched properly can an integral perspective of Bonhoeffer's 
motives and achievements in the area of ethics be obtained. 
CHAPTER I 
THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN DIETRICH BONHOEFFER'S 
LIFE AND THEOLOGY 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a theologian whose life spanned the 
era of the two World Wars. His dialectical theology was an ef-
fort to bring the gospel down to earth and place it at the centez 
of life. He interpreted the Christian message for a generation 
that felt the rise of Adolf Hitler and experienced the crises 
that National Socialism presented to Western Civilization. His 
writings and activitiesmade him a spokesman of the Confessing 
Church of Germany, the center of theological resistance to Hitler. 
while his convictions also demanded his active participation in 
the political resistance. Bonhoefferts ecclesiastical position 
and historical awareness revealed the implications and consequen-
ces of Nazism with such clarity that he envisioned a new moralit~ 
to render Christian attitudes operative. The attempt to formu-
late and live a modern ethic led to Bonhoeffer's execution in the 
Flossenberg Prison on the 9th of April, 1945. 
It ~as Bonhoeffer's historical situation and the concrete 
nature of his theology that caused him to turn to the matter of 
ethicso Bonhoeffer's ethical approach was historically condi-
tioned by the German post-war reconstruction and the pressures 
of Nazi opposition. The twentieth century revealed forces that 
5 
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exceeded the restraints of nineteenth century morality. The 
Third Reich created questions for which previous ethics had no 
answers. It is understandable that the theologian intent upon 
defining the mode of being of a Christian would feel it necessa 
to conceptualize that behavior proper to the contemporary believ-
er. Bonhoeffer's final work--his Ethics--was an attempt to 
establish morals in a manner consistent with the circumstances 
of his time and adequate to its ethical needs. Indeed, Ethics 
as his final word and martyrdom as his final act are correlatives 
and indicate that the context for understanding Bonhoeffer's 
oral theory is the dialectic of his theology and his life. 
~o follow the evolution of Bonhoeffer's ethical theory, it 
is necessary to accept the fact that he was first and foremost 
a theologian. Moreover, it is obvious that his theology shows 
stages of change consistent with his professional activities. 
Three general periods are evident in Bonhoeffer's life; these 
stages further serve to categorize his theological achievement. 
The first period, from his birth in 1906 to his acceptance of a 
London pastorate in 1933, covers his academic career. In the 
eriod from 1933 to approximately 1940, Bonhoeffer's activity 
oentered around the ecumenical movement and the struggle within 
Germany between the Confessing Church, which opposed Hitler, and 
the State Church, which supported Hitler. The third and final 
stage of Bonhoeffer's life, from 1940 to 1945, concerned his 
involvement in the political resistance to Hitler and his lengthy 
imprisonment. 
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There is debate as to which theological concern is dominant 
during each of these periods,l but general agreement as to the 
evidence of three stages. This consensus indicates the close 
relationship that exists between Bonhoefferts empirical situation 
and his theology. These three periods also show the influences 
operative in the ethical stance of Bonhoeffer. Therefore, these 
stages will constitute the order of this investigation. 
~ and University, 1906-1933 
The formative period of Bonhoeffer's life stretches from 
his birth in Breslau in 1906 to his exodus from the University of 
Berlin in October, 1933. The dual factors of home and university 
oondition the facets of Bonhoeffer's thought, and influence the 
later stages of his theology, ,systematic and moral. The concern 
for ethics is not pervasive during these years, yet certain pre-
cedents and directives are evident. 
Of the formative elements in Bonhoeffer's life and thought 
it is necessary to seriously consider his home. Indeed, Eber-
hard Bethge, Dietrich's close friend and official biographer, 
advises that "Bonhoeffer's life could be understood in terms of 
the Bonhoeffer family. The traits of his character, his decision 
IJohn D. Godsy says that the theme of Christology is the key 
to Bonhoeffer's thought. The TheOlO~y of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 19 0), pp. 265-66. Eberhard 
~ethge's opinion is that the "concretion of revelation ff is Bon-
noeffer's unifying concept. "The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoef-
fer's Life and Thought,1t The Chicago Theological Seminary Regis-
ter, LI (February, 1961), p. 3. 
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to take up the study of theology, even his martyrdom--all have 
their sources in the family.u2 The home was upper-middle class, 
scientifically orientated and secular minded. It was strongly 
conditioned by the personality of Dietrich's father. 
Karl Bonhoeffer was a doctor who accepted a chair in Neurol-
ogy and Psychiatry at the University of Berlin in 1912. He was a 
demanding father, but not domineering. He raised his eight chil-
dren in a thoroughly academic atmosphere and instilled in them an 
appreciation of leisure and culture. He was aloof and reserved, 
demanding that even his children demonstrate only adult quali-
ties. However, punishment was never phYSical or coercive; 
rather, it was simply done with such mannerisms as an ironical 
smile or a raise in the eyebrows. 3 Karl Bonhoeffer reared his 
children as Lutherans, but his scientific bent of mind reduced 
the religious mood of the family to a humanism of responsible 
action and concern for others. 
Dietrich's mother, Paula, came from a long line of distin-
guished ecclesiastics, her grandfather being Carl von Hase, a 
noted church historian of the nineteenth century. She gave Die-
trich his physical appearance, exuberant spirit and feeling for 
music. Her grief at the war death of her second son, Walter, 
2Ved Metha, The New Theologian (New York: Harper and Row, 
1965), p. 146. Mitlia'TfSchapter on "Pastor Bonhoeffer" is the re-
sult of interviews with personal friends and profeSSional asso-
ciates of Bonhoeffer. 
3This appraisal is given by Sabine Leibholz, Dietrich's 
twin Sister, in her article "Childhood and Home lf in I Knew Die-
trich Bonhoeffer (New York: 1966), po 21. - ---- ---
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may have pre-disposed Dietrich to take a pacifistio position in 
the Second World War. 4 At any rate, her warmth offset the cool 
self-oontrol of her husband and made the home a life-long influ-
ence on the unmarried Dietrich. 
The careers of the Bonhoeffer children were in tune with 
either the scientific concerns of the father or the ministerial 
precedents in their lineage. Karl Friedrich, the eldest, was a 
biochemist; Walter was studying to be a zoologist before his 
death at the front; Klaus was an adventurer and traveled exten-
sively. These three eldest children were intellectual and agnos-
tic; their interests concerned soientific subjects. They rein-
forced the secular temperament of the Bonhoeffer household. 
From temperament and reaotion to the successes of his older 
~rothers, Dietrich decided to study theology when he was fourteen 
years old. Dietrich, with Sabine and Suzanne, comprised the 
"little ones" of the family. He realized that he had slight 
chance of distinguishing himself in an area previously entered 
by another brother. Karl Friedrich was considered the most in-
telligent of the children while Walter was the most heroic in 
the eyes of the parents. 5 Dietrich, therefore, chose the study 
of Hebrew during his last tWG years at the GymnaSium. He thereby 
displayed a commitment to the ministry even though it was dis-
tasteful to the family. "The Bonhoeffer's were not a church-go~ 
4 Metha, p. 148. 
5Ibido, pp. 149-50. 
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family and all the family baptisms, weddings and funerals were 
performed in the house by an uncle, who was a pastor, and even 
so, was the victim of a certain amount of derision. tt6 However, 
Dietrich's competitive spirit? needed a field to call his own, 
and at seventeen he began taking theology courses at the Univer-
sity of !ubingeno 
Only a fragmented pioture oan be drawn of Bonhoefferts home 
life. However, it had a formative importanoe in his ethics. A 
search for the element of continuity in Bonhoeffer's thought, for 
the source of the theme of "worldly Christianity," of an "ethics 
of responsibility," or for the empirical flavor of his final 
period, has certain origins within the Bonhoeffer homeo Refer-
ence must now be made to the extra-familial and academic forces 
that impressed Bonhoeffer's first period, simply because of the 
lack of an authoritative biography.8 Enough has been said, how-
ever, to predict a certain regard for the concrete in his moral 
theology, and a predominant interest in the ethical decisions 
6Ibid., p. 1510 
?The need to excel within Bonhoeffer is often mentioned by 
those who knew him. Emmi Bonhoeffer, Klaus' wife, mentions his 
will to win at sports when a child. I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
p. 35. At Union Theological Seminary~ ~oid Paul Lehmann he 
would not play tennis with anyone who was not proficient at the 
game. Ibid., p. 43. He told Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann that he 
wished to die young so that he would not have to know the decline 
of his abilities. Matha,~. 2!!., p. 143. 
8Bonhoeffer's close friend, Eberhard Bethge, is presently 
preparing the official biography of his life, but the magnitude 
of the work will delay publication for a number of years. 
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demanded by the war conditions of Germany. Moreover, the impor-
tance afforded responsibility and obedience as ethical functions, 
and his distrust of conscience as a moral guide, have some resem-
~lance to the structure of his early education, his Lutheran 
instruction and his father's views on human psychology. 
Tutorial influences, evident and oonsistent throughout Bon-
~oeffer's life, began with his study of theology and philosophy 
at the University of Tubingen, 1923-24. Adolf Schlatter was the 
~ominant theological influence on Bonhoeffer. He gave Bonhoef-
~er's theology a biblical orientation. Bonhoeffer's personal 
copies of Schlatter's works are filled with marginal notes and 
~ere referred to in the preparation of nearly all his later ser-
~ons and exegeses. Bonhoeffer's philosophical studies emphasized 
epistemology and later he used the idealist theory of knowledge 
~revalent in the German universities as a defense against a~ 
intrusion of philosophy into the area of ultimate reality. 
!he following year, Bonhoeffer entered the University of 
~erlin to study under the men whose scholarship constituted a 
~utheran renaissance. Bonhoeffer was impressed by Adolf von 
~arnack and Reinhold Seeberg, the latter being his academic advi-
~or. However, the dominant inspiration during Bonhoeffer's doc-
~oral study, in4eed, of his entire theological career, was Karl 
~arth whom he never had in class. Bonhoeffer's diligent reading 
of Barth's "Epistle to the Romans" and "Church Dogmatics" is 
evident in Bonhoeffer's first dissertation which awarded him the 
licentiate in theology at the early age of twenty-one. The 
12 
Communion of Saints:··! DOgmatio Inquiry ~ the Sooiology .2! 
the Church (1927) clearly shows Bonhoeffer's association with 
Barth on the oentrality of Revelation and his alliance with the 
majority of the Berlin faculty in reaotion to "Liberal Theology'!.... 
an eighteenth century humanization of the bible. 
BY January of 1928, Bonhoeffer had finished his first exami-
nation for the ministry and began his year of curateship in a 
German parish of Baroelon~, Spain. It was at this time that his 
first formal concern with ethics is evidento The pastoral work 
of counselling required his occupation with moral problems. 
Moreover, the method and problems that he aooepted theologically, 
i.e., the dialectical theology common with Barth and the Reforma-
tion concern of relating gospel and law, necessitated an increas-
ingly concrete and systematic explioation of dogma. The advice 
of Professor Seeberg at this juncture was catalytic. He wrote 
to his student that "the history of ethics and still more of 
morality is a sphere in which a young man might well make a cor-
ner for himself today, perhaps with the aim of writing a history 
of ethical dogma from the Sermon on the Mount up to our own 
days.n9 Seeberg had directed Bonhoeffer's dissertation and must 
have noticed the scattered references to ethioslO and judged them 
9Dietr1ch Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords: Letters, Lectures 
~,Notes 1928-1936, Vol. I,-ed. Edwin H. Robertson, trans. Edwin 
~. Robertson and John Bowden (New'York: Harper and Row, 1965), 
p. 360 
lOThis dissertation touches on ethics but not with a degree 
of purposefulness or organization that deserves comment here. 
These references will be developed in the systematic analysis of 
13 
promising enough to suggest their development. Just before leav-
ing Barcelona, Bonhoeffer addressed his congregation on "What Is 
a Christian Ethic?tI,ll formulating his first organized attempt at 
a theology of ethics. Again, Bonhoeffer's approach was dialecti-
oal, and he committed himself to a solution of the dilemma stated 
as the antithesis of gospel and law, of graoe and nature. This 
reoonoiliatory purpose displayed by Bonhoeffer's original state-
ment on ethics is present throughout his work as its developmen-
tal forceo 12 The accurate statement of the relationship of the 
Gospel and the Law was a primary motive behind Bonhoeffer's moral 
theologyo 
After a year in Barcelona, Bonhoeffer returned to Berlin to 
write his inaugural dissertation, entitled Aot and Being.13 
later chapterso For the present, to substantiate the assertion 
that Bonhoeffer's theological stUdies included ethical concerns, 
see Bonhoefferts The Communion of Saints: A Do~atic Inquiry int~ 
the SOCiOlO~y of the Church, trans. R. Gregor mith (New York: 
Harper and ow, 1963), ppo 23, 29, and 40 for comments on histor-
ioal ethical systems; pp. 32 and 35 for the ethioal element in 
his anthropologyo 
llNo Rusty Swords, ppo 39-48. 
12Gerhard Ebeling assesses this problem as the key to Bon-
hoeffer's theologyo Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1963), chap. Iy-;-nDietrich Bonhoeffer." 
13Fastor Zimmermann gives the following information about 
the genesis of Act and Being: "For centuries after the Reforma-
tion the churches or-the German states were separated from real 
life. They were governed by the states. In all that time, the 
only alternative to the state ethics was pietismo In 1919, when 
the Kirchenbund, a very loose federation of the independent pro-
vincial ohurches, established in 1871, finally got a little au-
thority, and there could be such a thing as a church social ethic 
that was different from the social ethic of the state, this inde-
pendence created a lot of problems, because the Church had no 
14 
This thesis was necessary for acceptance into the theological 
faculty of the University. With its approval Bonhoeffer gave 
his inaugural address, "Man in Contemporary Philosophy and Theol-
ogy,,14 on July 31, 19300 These two efforts give Bonhoeffer's 
most extensive reference to philosophy. Through bibliography and 
text they give valuable information concerning the sources accep-
ted within his own position and his analysis of various philo-
sophical systems. 
Philosophy filters through Bonhoeffer's theological premises 0 
Two fundamental concepts of Lutheranism are central to Bonhoef-
fer's search for rational categories capable of expressing the 
content of revelation--that man is "incapax infiniti,,15 and that 
the human heart is "curvum in se.,,16 Critical philosophy monopo-
lizes philosophical discussions, demonstrating Bonhoeffer's pre-
occupation with the late Modern period in the history of philos-
ophy and his acceptance of the Kantian theory of knowledge. That 
human knowledge never grasps more than its own forms is consis-
tent with these Lutheran dogmas and supports his conclusion of 
experience in ruling itself. Bonhoeffer's book "Act and Beingtl 
was concerned with this problem: What is a Christian ethic in 
everyday life? This problem became all the more important when 
the Church capitulated to the state once again, under Nazism ••• " 
Metha, po 143. 
14 No Rusty Swords, pp. 50-690 
l5Act and Being, p. 83. Also used three times in Bonhoef-
fer's inaugural lecture. 
l6Act and Being, pp. 32, 47, 89, and 156. Also quoted once 
in "Man in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology." 
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philosophy's ~inal deficiency. Bonhoeffer's familiarity with 
this period of German philosophy testifies to both the philosoph-
ical exposure he had received academically and to a regulating 
~actor in his ethical theory, namely, that reason is incapable of 
reaching objective reality or moralityo This position is pro-
17 posed on a theological basis and defended by the Kantian doc-
trine of man's epistemological isolation. 
In recognizing this trend of thought and its origins it 
should also be noted that these works show considerable study 
and knowledge of publications on ethics. Both individual works, 
such as Max Scheler's Formalism in Ethics and an Ethic of Mater-
ial Value, and presentations of a more general nature, such as 
Wilhelm Windlebrand's History of Modern Philosop~ and Emanuel 
Hirsch's Philosophies of Idealism, show Bonhoef~er's familiarity 
with ethical systems. Investigation of these contrary positions 
surely added precision and sharpness to the differences that 
Bonhoeffer felt between "Christian ethics" and moral philosophy. 
Furthermore, with the dialectic of historical systems, Bonhoeffer 
clarified his own thought. 
Before beginning a full-time position on the Berlin faculty, 
Bonhoeffer received a Sloane Fellowship for post-docUral study at 
Union Theological Seminary in New York. In September of 1930, 
Bonhoeffer arrived at Union Seminary to take courses and to 
17"The thought imprisoned in itself, is the true expression 
of man questioning himself (or the world) in statu corruptionis. ft 
No Rusty Swords, p. 60. 
16 
absorb the American scene. Two of the four papers extant from 
this period concern ethics--"The Character and Ethical Conse-
quence of Religious Determinism" and nThe Religious Experience 
of Grace and the Ethical Life. n1B 
This intensified activity in the area of ethics may be an 
indication of the influence of Professor Eugene Lyman and the 
practical quality of American philosophy. Pragmatism was totally 
foreign to Bonhoeffer's philosophical background, yet !the applied 
his German vigour and determination to a mastery, particularly of 
'Williams James, under Lyman's guidance.,,19 Besides this factor, 
.inisterial work with the negroes of New York increased Bonhoef-
fer's sensitivity to the moral issue of racism due to his cul-
tural appreciation of the negro mentality. Only among the ne-
groes did Bonhoeffer hear the gospel "really preached and aocep-
ted with great welcome and visible emotion."20 These two expo-
sures served Bonhoeffer well in the coming years. The imprint of 
William James' philosophy is evident in the sections on responsi-
~ility, and the meaning of the future for ethical considerations 
in the essays Bonhoeffer wrote from prison. 21 The negro problem 
IBGodsey, ~. cit., p. 25. 
191 Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 43. 
20No Rusty Swords, p. 113. This observation is included in 
Bonhoeffer's address giving his impressions on American theology, 
called "Religion without Reformation." 
21Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. 
Eberhard Bethse, trans. Reginald H. FUrler (New-rork: The Macmil-
lan Co., 1953), p. 20 ffo 
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was analogous to the ethical decisions entailed in the Aryan 
Clauses of the Third Reich. 
Bonhoeffer stopped in Bonn on his return to Germany in late 
July of 1931 in order to speak with Karl Barth. Bonhoeffer's 
high esteem for Barth and his theological position only increased 
with this personal encounter. 22 Agreement existed between the 
two scholars except in the area of ethics. Bonhoeffer's own es-
timation of the disagreement is as follows: 
We very soon came to the problem of ethics and had a 
long discussion. He would not make concessions to me 
where I expected that he would have had to. Besides 
the one great light in the night, he said, there were 
also many other little lamps, so called "relative ethi-
cal criteria;ff he could not, however, make their sig-
nificance and application and nature comprehensible to 
me--we didn't get beyond his reference to the Bible. 
Finally he thought that I was making grace into a 
principle and killing everything else with it. Of 
course I disputed the first point and wanted to know 
why everything else should not be killed. 23 
This debate clarified Bonhoeffer's ethical stance to him-
self. With the Barth-Bonhoeffer discussion, the main ingredients 
of Dietrich's moral theory are evident. From this pOint, the 
development of Bonhoeffer's ethics was effected by external, en-
vironmental factors more than by intrinsic, logical deductions. 
It is interesting that changing circumstances will give Bonhoef-
fer a concern for principles that are "relatively absolute,,24 
22At this time, Bonhoeffer wrote to a friend, Erwin Sutz: ttl 
don't think that I have ever regretted any thing that I have 
failed to do in my theological past as much as the fact that I 
did not come here [Bonn] sooner." No Rusty Swords, p. 122. 
23No Rusty Swords, p. 121. 
24Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Neville 
Horton Smith (New York: The Macmillan Co •• lq6i;) D 2~q 
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which at this time were incomprehensible to him. 
On his return to Berlin, Bonhoeffer settled down to univer-
sity life, but with a growing involvement in both the ecclesias-
tical and the political problems of Germany. During his two 
years as a Privatdozent or lecturer, Bonhoeffer conducted course~ 
in the history of twentieth century systematic theology, the 
nature of the church, creation and sin, and Christology, as well 
as seminars on the idea of philosophy in Protestant theology, 
Christian ethics, contemporary theological literature and Hegelt~ 
philosophy of religion. 25 The content of these lectures is lost 
except for the application that they found within Bonhoeffer's 
ecclesiastical and ecumenical addresses. 26 
It is necessary to realize the historical developments of 
these crucial years, to see the significance of Bonhoeffer's 
growing activismo The power of Adolf Hitler was increasing and 
having repercussions within clerical circles. The German church 
was split under the pressure. One faction tended towards state 
domination while the Confessing Church reacted to such external 
motivation as un-Christian. Much of this ecclesiastical infight-
ing was carried on through the organizations of the ecumenical 
movement which further served the German resistance by publiciz-
ing the actual state of affairs, both religious and political, 
25Godsey, 2£. cit., po 78 ff. 
26Bethge has reconstructed the course on Christology from 
student notes. His findings are contained in a volume called 
Christ the Center (Harper and Row, 1960). 
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within Germany. With his appointment in September, 1931, as 
Youth Secretary for the World Alliance for Promoting Internation-
!! Friendship through the Churches, Bonhoeffer officially entered 
the ecumenical movement. His university position, the completioI 
of the draft of Creation and !!1l, and the theological basis of 
his controversy with the National Christians, portray Bonhoeffer 
as very much the scholar. However, the political situation de-
manded ever more clear applications of Bonhoeffer's dogmatic 
principles. 
One such application was the "orders of preservation" that 
Bonhoeffer developed during the Theological Conference for Ecu-
menical Youth Work in Berlin, April, 1932. Professor Stahlin 
and Pastor Peters of the State Church spoke for recognition of 
the "orders of creation" in theology, which simultaneously could 
be a foundation for the historical determinism that Nazism advo-
cated. In opposition, Bonhoeffer demanded recognition of the 
fallen nature of the world and the action of Christ as the sole 
justification of any order within this corrupted world. These 
"orders of preservation" are the source of Bonhoeffer's final 
proposals on the It natural tt and the "Penultimate. tt It is at this 
point that Bonhoefferts ethics is cut off consciously and in 
principle from any natural or rational criterion of right and 
wrong, i.e., any Natural Law ethic. 
Later that same year, Bonhoeffer gave a paper to the Youth 
Peace Conference in Czechoslovakia on "A Theological Basis for 
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the World Alliance?It. 27 He developed his ideas on the "orders of 
preservation" and also denied the possibility of state interven-
tion on the grounds of either the ambiguity of the gospel message 
or the non-political character of Christianity. The former as-
pect was a development of his Barcelona sermon on "The Question 
of a Christian Ethic" and its investigation of the relationship 
of gospel and law. If the ambiguities of the bible were allowed 
to inactivate the Christian, then the commandments were meaning-
less. Therefore, Bonhoeffer proposes that the Law is always 
concrete, always definite in this situation. The reality of the 
moment determines the various biblical attitudes and directives 
on war to either "engage in this warn or lido not engage in this 
war." The gospel as preached today holds the unequivocal lawo 
Moreover, the demand for Christian responsibility that was natur-
al in such eventful times was developed as the Christian's neces-
sary participation in the orders of preservation, or those condi-
tions that are susceptible to the "new creation of Christ.1t Bon-
hoeffer, then, takes exception to Kant's moral theory, though he 
does not repudiate the Kantian theory of knowledge. 28 Bonhoeffer 
holds that the nature of law as preached constitutes some things 
27No Rustl Swords, PPo 157-1730 
28In spite of Bonhoeffer's acceptance with the findings of 
critical epistemology, he believed that Kant's development of 
Formalism in morality was questionable. "It is wrong to say that 
only the will can be good." No Rustl Swords, p. 171. As early 
as The Communion of Saints, he had taken exceptionto Kant's 
ethics, because "from many different starting points in his ethic 
Kant could have destroyed his own epistemologyo" Communion of 
Saints, p. 211, n. 60 
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as goodo 
In 1933, the situation in Germany rapidly deterioratedo 
Hitler became Chancellor; the "German Christians tt gained 70% of 
the vote in the General Church election and Ludwig Muller became 
the national bishopo Just two days after Hitler's~ection, Bon-
hoeffer attacked the "leadership principle lt in a radio broad-
cast29 only to be cut off before the completion of the addresso 
In this talk Bonhoeffer proposed the distinction between "ulti-
mate" andt'penultimate" to categorize those authorities which have 
an absolute or merely a relative claim to the Christian consci~a 
The state le~der was relegated only a relative authorityo When 
the state church accepted the Aryan Clauses which forbade church 
office to the Jews, Bonhoeffer immediately attacked their un-
Christian premise30 and worked with Martin Niemoller on a "Pas-
tor's Emergency League" to help the clerical victims of this 
anti-semitism. Bonhoeffer's decisive analysis of Hitler's pro-
gram was remarkable in regard to the early stage and complexity 
of Nazism. Few saw the consequences to the state or church 
caused by National Socialism, with such clarity as Bonhoeffer. 
The consequent sense of responsibility carried Bonhoeffer from 
the University of Berlin to a parish in London and the task of 
interpreting the state of affairs in Germany to the world. An 
29No Rusty Swords, ppo 190-204~ 
30uThe Church and the Jewish Question," No Rusty Swords, 
pp. 221-2290 --
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ethical system that not only distinguished the decisions possi-
ble but also carried one from the state of indecision to one of 
responsible activity was necessaryo 
Ecclesiastical Period, 1933-1939 
Bonhoeffer's period of pure academic concern terminated 
with his departure for a London pastorate. He thus began a time 
of intense pastoral activity. This middle period bridged the 
academician and the conspirator; it saw the transformation of th 
theologian into a church spokesman. Consideration of Bonhoef-
fer's ethical theory until 1933 is mainly of the influences of 
home and university--his cultural, intellectual and religious 
environment. Theologically, Bonhoeffer's interests had centered 
on the nature of the church. In the transition to a more eccle-
siastical mode of activity, Bonhoeffer's theological attentions 
focused on Hermeneutics and his ethical awareness intensified. 
True, much of Bonhoeffer's ethics was implicit in the sources he 
consciously or unconsciously accepted, but no systematic program 
was given. Bonhoeffer's intentions and vocabulary were still 
dogmatic. The conditions encountered during this second period 
from 1933 to 1939 were to stamp Bonhoeffer's ethics with their 
practical exigencies. 
To approach this phase in the amplification of Bonhoefferts 
thought, it is useful to make his position as rector of the Fin-
kenwald seminary the context of discussiono In this capacity, 
Bonhoeffer was both the practical churchman, representin the 
23 
interests and intellectualism of the Confessing Church and the 
pastor concerned with guiding the education and spiritual devel-
opment of the seminarianso His writings of this period can be 
similarly classified by division into the articles and addresses 
whose motive was church discipline and those longer works whose 
purpose was spiritual direction even though both forms use the 
method of biblical exegesis. In these two respects, Bonhoeffer 
attempted to practice the theory of his academic period, which 
effort led to his conception of a major work in ethics. 
The six years covered by this second stage are ones of grow-
ing disillusionment for the churchman. They begin in London 
with Bonhoeffer's introduction to the bishop of Chichester, a 
leader of the World Alliance. Together they planned a program 
to bring the pressures available through the ecumenical movement 
to bear on the internal affairs of Germany. But, prophetically, 
Bonhoeffer also was showing an interest in the resistance methods 
of Mahat Gandhi. Only the call from the Confessing Church to 
lead their seminary in Pomerania prevented his journey to India~l 
Four papers deserve mention as indicators of the mentality 
of Bonhoeffer's ecclesiastical work: "The Confessing Church and 
the Ecumenical Movement,u32 "The Question of the Boundries of the 
31Such interest was not new. At Barcelona Bonhoeffer read 
extensively in Buddhism and he had planned to visit Gandhi in In-
dia at the end of his first American tour only to have his trip 
cancelled when he could find no one to accompany him. Such in-
terest was consistent with Bonhoeffer's own pacifistic position 
towards a possible war effort by Germany. 
32No Rusty Swords, pp. 326-344. 
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Church and Church Union,,,33 "Statements about the Power of the 
Keys and Church Discipline in the New Testament,,,34 and "Our Way 
According to the Testimony of Scriptureo lf35 With progressive em· 
phasis, Bonhoeffer demands that the church is not an ideal or a 
program (these are always ineffective). It is not just a spiri-
tual influence but rather the hard reality of God's living word. 
Consequently, what the times require is not "our own realization 
of our own aims, but obedienceo,,36 Any legalism could corrupt 
the Confessing Church, and therefore, Bonhoeffer's progressive 
concern was that obedience to the Word and not adherence to any 
principles was the spirit of Christian ethics. Again, the prob-
lem of gospel and law, freedom and duty was central, though for 
different reasons. 
Early in 1938, Bonhoeffer showed literary signs of his grow 
ing disenchantment with the church resistance due to internal 
tensions and open Nazi oppression. At this time he made his 
first contacts with the political resistance. Moreover, he arti-
culated this disappointment in his letter to the clergy of Pomer-
ania saying, "The church struggle can be law or gospel. At the 
moment it has becomelaw •••• ,,37 The point at issue was the 
and 
-...--
Wl.n 
pp. 
33Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Way to Freedom: Letters, Lecturef 
Notes 1935-19390 Vol. II, ed. Edwin H. Robertson, trans. Ed-
H~ Robertson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, 1966 
75-96. 
34Ibid., pp. 149-1600 
35Ibid., ppo 173-193. 
36No Rusty Swords, p. 344. 
37The Way to Freedom, p. 168. 
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inability of the bible to define or justify a concrete plan of 
action: Scriptural proof cannot be given to demonstrate the right 
or wrong of a particular course or act. The hesitation within 
the Confessing Church while it searched Revelation for a direc-
tive was jeopardizing the whole venture. To avoid this dilemma, 
Bonhoeffer noted that the bible "is not meant to be an insurance 
policy for our ways.n38 The indecision of the Confessing Church 
was typical of a rationalistic ethic. To Bonhoeffer's mind, the 
only realistic and creative solution was responsible action done 
in faith. Ultimately, of course, this is the Lutheran doctrine 
that man is justified by faith, not works, but this premise was 
brought home emphatically by the experience of the Confessing 
Church. 
The Nazi effort to crush the opposition began in earnest 
after the 1936 Olympics in Berlin and had two important results 
in Bonhoeffer's mind: first, Nazism cut off the Confession from 
its international contacts, and, secondly, Nazism restricted the 
outlook of the Confessing Church to self-preservationo In 1939, 
Bonhoeffer left Germany in spite of the imminence of war, con-
vinced that the Confessing Church's international contacts had to 
be maintained. Moreover, he did not want his pacifism to further 
endanger the status of the Confession. 
This was the final effort of the ecclesiastic to render the 
church of the resistance effective. However, the decision to 
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leave Germany had important repercussions in Bonhoeffer's thought 
The struggle of conscience deciding whether he was running away 
or genuinely motivated in leaving Germany gave purpose and direc-
tion to his wish to write on Christian ethics. 39 The importance 
of this mental battle in Bonhoeffer's estimation is contained in 
the passages he added to his diary at this time. 
It is remarkable how I am never quite sure about the 
motives for any of my decisions •• o The reasons one gives 
for an action to others and to one's self are certainly 
inadequate. One can give a reason for everything. In 
the last resort, one acts from a level which remains 
hidden from us. So one can only ask God to judge us 
and to forgive us. (20th June, 1939)40 
However, he concluded he was wrong to come to America. While re-
turning to Germany he added to his diary: 
Perhaps I have learnt more in this month than in a 
whole year, nine years ago; at any rate, I have ac-
quired some important insights for all future deci-
sions. Probably the visit will have a great effect 
on meo (7th July, 1939)41 
As a seminary director, there is an entirely different 
dimension to Bonhoefferts work o The years between 1933 and 1939 
were concerned with preparing seminarians in their last year of 
training for the ministryo It was Bonhoeffer's duty to provide 
a model of the Christian life both in regard to the seminary dis-
cipline and studyo As rector, "Bonhoeffer never laid down any 
39Bethge relates that "already at the time of completing hie 
Nachfolge [The Cost of Discipleship (1937)1 Bonhoeffer was plan-
ning a new approach to the problems of ChrIstian Ethics." 
Ethics, p. 110 
40The Vay to Freedom, p. 233. 
41Ibid., p. 2470 
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rules. He made up procedures as he went along and revised them 
as practice required ••• He confided to Pastor Bethge that he also 
distrusted theory in theology.,,42 As a pastor trying to describe 
the mentality of the believer, Bonhoeffer tended to demand the 
distinction of world and church which is not characteristic of 
either his earlier work or his contemporary ecumenical writingso 
The Cost of Discipleship explained Bonhoeffer's experience 
at Finkenwald and the meaning that it had given the Christian 
life. This work is the clearest and longest effort of Bonhoef-
~er's middle period and shows the function of Revelation in the 
programming of one's behavioro Belief must make a difference in 
one's actions: grace is not cheap. Implicit in the "yes" of the 
believer is a "no" to the world as anything that hinders one's 
confession. Previously in his capacity as seminary director most 
of Bonhoeffer's writings were devotional or liturgical, e.g., 
'King David," "Temptation," Life Together and a "Prayerbook of 
~he Bible." However, The Cost of Discipleship rose from the 
piblical study of the seminary's curriculumo 43 Its background is 
~iven by Bonhoeffer's report for 1936. 
Lectures and exercises stand now, as ever, under the sha-
dow of biblical worko After dealing with the II Discipleship 
42 Metha, p. 157. 
43In a letter to Karl Barth on Sept. 19, 1936, Bonhoeffer ex 
plained the academic concerns of Finkenwalde. "The chief ques-
~ions are those of the exposition of the Sermon on the Mount and 
~he Pauline doctrine of justification and sanctification. I am 
engaged in a work [Cost of Discipleship] on the subject and I 
fNould have asked and learnt a very, very great deal from you." 
~ Way to Freedom, p. 116. 
of Christ" in the first course, the theme "The Visible 
Church tf followed in the second, liThe New Life in Paul" 
in the third and "Concrete Ethics in Paul lt in the pre-
sent semester ••• I believe that a certain climax has 
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been reached with the present course. While I am writ-
ing this report, a two and a half day long disputation 
is going on, from morning to evening, on ItThe Preaching 
of the Law" ••• Our community is knit more closely toge-
ther by this common work on a question which is so signi-
ficant for our church todayo 44 
Bonhoeffer's themes of the "hiddenness of Christian life" 
or the "great divide lt between the church and the world,45 and his 
ecclesiastical theme during this time differ. However, the im-
pression should not be taken that there is no continuity in the 
aspect of his thought. The themes of "deputyship" and the iden-
tification of the faithful and the ethical life are contained in 
Bonhoeffer's earliest dissertation46 and have precedents within 
this second period as well. 47 The presentation of The Cost of 
Discipleship shows the Lutheran orthodoxy that was a constant 
factor in Bonhoeffer's writings. 
Finkenwalde was closed in 1937, and the ever-increasing 
pressure of the Gestapo gradually eliminated even those substi-
tute training centers that the Confessing Church established. 
44 Ibid., p. 125. 
45See the table of contents, Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Disci-
~leship, rev. and unabridged ed., trans. R. H. Fuller (New York: 
!The Macmillan Co., 1963), pp. 5-6. 
46Cf • Communion of Saints, p. 107. 
47In his essay "The Interpretation of the New Testament,tl 
~ Rusty Swords, ppo 308-325, Bonhoeffer suggests a science of 
hermeneutics that if applied in the case of a concrete ethical 
decision, would constitute ethics as post factum biblical refer-
ence. 
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Bonhoeffer's operations were hampered at every turn; in 1936, he 
was restricted from lecturing at the university, in 1937, travel 
became difficult, and by 1939, his age group was about to be 
drafted for military service. Whereas Bonhoeffer's academic 
period was crowned with success, this second period ended in 
apparent failure with his doubt-filled resolve to leave Germany. 
When he returned in July of 1939, it was to a new mode of activi-
ty and a different expression of his thought. 
Politics and Prison, 1939-1945 
The last division of Bonhoeffer's life that will be consi-
dered is that of 1940 to his execution in 1945. The outlines of 
is ethical theory have been given in his academic period; the 
ethod and motive for his approach resulted from biblical empha-
sis and his experiences centering around the Finkenwalde Semin-
ary. The attraction to ethiCS, evident in both periods, comes to 
fruition with the circumstances that Bonhoeffer faced in the last 
ive years of his life. 
By this time, ethics was seen as the conclusion of both his 
heological work and necessity of his lived experience. Eberhard 
ethge who was Bonhoeffer's confessor during the time at Finken-
aIde and confidant during the years in prison, says that 
Already at the time of completing his Nachfolge [Cost of 
Disci*leshiP (1937)J Bonhoeffer was planning a new ap-
proac to the problems of Christian ethics. He thought 
of this as the beginning of his actual life work. In 
June of 1939, he was invited by Professor John Baillie, 
on behalf of the Croall Lectureship Trust, to lecture 
at Edinburgh, and he 
basis for his book. 
tions and he did not 
1940048 
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hoped to make his lectures the 
The war put an end to his prepara-
take up this work again until 
Bonhoeffer was a careful thinker and he must have been 
aware of the divergent trends of his thought. In his first dis-
sertation he studied the sociological-empirical forms of the 
church; in the Cost of Discipleship he devoted a whole chapter to 
the "Hidden Character of the Christian Lifeo n49 As an official 
Qf the Confessing Church he advocated involvement; as the pastor 
pf Finkenwalde he demanded the separation of church and world. 
ae writes glowing praise of Karl Barth and in the same letter con 
~esses he is departing from his viewso 50 The compulsion to write 
pn ethics systematically was partially caused by the need to 
reconcile the many facets of his thought. 
But the wish of the theologian for clarity and application51 
was intensified by Bonhoeffer's duties in the resistance. He had 
48 Ethics, p. 11. 
49The Cost of Discipleship, ppo 172-192. 
50The Way to Freedom, p. 116. 
51While waiting to return to Germany from America in 1939, 
~onhoeffer outlined in his diary the "outstanding problems of pre 
~ent continental theology" which he carried unresolved back to 
rtermanyo He lists: "1) Confession and damnation, 2) the Church, 
~) the powers ordained by God, 4) Christian life, the meaning of 
~uffering, 5) Church and Synod, 6) Christ and Antichrist, and 7) 
phristlike life." The ~ay to Freedom, p. 232. Such methodieal-
~ess is typical of~n oef?ir's mind and shows the range of ques-
~ions that went into the formulation of his Ethics. 
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returned to Germany just before the outbreak of the Second World 
War. Quickly, Bonhoeffer was forbidden to preach or publish; he 
was forced to relinquish all his duties regarding seminary train-
ing, and had to report regularly to the Berlin police. Politi-
cally, he was a marked man and Bonhoeffer responded in August of 
1940 by joining those conspiring against Hitler's regime. He 
obtained a position in the Abwehr or Military Intelligence Office 
with the support of certain military opponents of Hitler, and 
~egan his tasks in the Counter-Espionage. Bonhoeffer was con-
~inced now that his political convictions and religious belief 
could not be separated. 
Although Bonhoeffer used his position to aid the Confessing 
Church, his main task was political. He used his ecumenical in-
~luence to seek the Allied governments' terms of surrender in the 
event that internal resistance could overthrow Hitler in May of 
19420 By day he worked on Ethics and at night he met with the 
~esistanceo As a Christian he lied, stole and plotted the assas-
sination of Hitler. This double life that Bonhoeffer led was a 
problem to his conscience, and indeed, made him suspect even in 
church circles. tlWhen eventually he was imprisoned, his name did 
Inot appear on the intercession list of the confessing church. ,,52 
Bonhoefferts work in ethics--his conversations,53 his 
52E• A. Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Richmond: 
~ess, 1966), p. 110 
John Knox 
53Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann speaks of Bonhoeffer's 
with the ethical problems of marriage and the family 
with the question of Hitler's assassination in 1942. 
preoccupation 
in 1939, and 
I Knew 
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fragmentary book, his essays54 and letters while in prison--
should be seen as expressive of his vision of a "worldly Chris-
tianityo" Ethics is his example of the "non-religious interpre-
tation of theological conceptsotl Ethics was written to show the 
Christian how to accept the world tt come of age ,,55 in his behav-
ior. Bonhoeffer's concern was to translate the will of God into 
human terms; to allow the divine commandments to function in 
moral deliberation. Bonhoeffer's ethical system has been called 
a "contextualist understanding of ethics,,,56 to indicate the 
importance of the temporal situation in moral problem-solving. 
This concrete ethic is demanded by Bonhoeffer's basic premise 
that the Gospel-as-preached is always self-evident in terms of 
its present meaning. Thus, Ethics has a style and approach that 
is different from earlier works even though they touch on the 
same subjects. The methodology of Ethics is not biblical exege-
sis--it is rather that fusion of fact and faith indicative of 
Bonhoefferts life. 
Bonhoeffer's life and theology are indispensible for 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 190. Oskar Hammelsbeck speaks of their 
d1scussions on Natural Law. Ibid., p. 186. 
54"The First Table of the Ten Commandments," in John D. God-
sey, A Preface to Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965) 
~p. 5'0-670 -
55The phrases in parentheses are taken 
June 8, 1944, addressed to Eberhard Bethge. 
pp. 194-200. 
from the letter of 
Letters and Papers, 
56Alvin C. Porteous (ed.), Prophetic Voices in Contemporary 
Theology (New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), p. 168-0-
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understanding his ethic. As his life becomes more "secular,tI his 
theology evolves to liberate the Christian for the world. Ethics 
is the surest indication of this theological tendency. "All the 
earlier works: the sociology of the Church, the methodology of 
theology, the biblical concern for discipleship, the disciplines 
of devotion--all these pointed to the Ethics.,,57 
However, Bonhoeffer's theological premises were a foundation 
that remained throughout his life. He began from principles that 
were limits to his thought in spite of his changing circumstances 
and attention. These principles are the ground for the continu-
ity that is evident in his thoughto Once the starting points are 
established, one thinks as he must in order to be consistent. It 
is precisely these preconceptions, the premises implicit and ex-
p11cit in Bonhoeffer's work that must now be consideredo 
57Martin E. Marty (ed.), The Place of Bonhoeffer (New York: 
Association Press, 1962), po l~ 
CHAPrER II 
THE RELATION OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
IN BONHOEFFER'S ETHICS 
The terminology that Bonhoeffer uses is basically theologi-
calo An historical approach regarding his theology is necessary 
in order to comprehend the intention and significance of his 
concepts. Seen from the perspective of Bonhoeffer's life, his 
theology develops to its central enterprise in Ethics. This is 
the major work of that period in which Bonhoeffer attempted to 
give faith a non-theological language and show the worldly stance 
of Christianity. Events developed in such a way that the schol-
arly, dogmatic theologian was compelled by Christian responsibil-
ity to assume the role of the counter-spy, plotting the defeat of 
Hitler. Consequently, Bonhoeffer's ethics is a conscious attempt 
to give the world, the natural and the rational, a place in his 
theology equal to that status it had in his everyday life. 
Ethics is the result of this intention and the clearest summary 
of Bonhoeffer's moral theory. Many terms and expressions in his 
ethical work, therefore, have a secular quality that is not pre-
sent in his dogmatic theology. However, the vocabulary of Ethics 
is not an innovation that lacks continuity with Bonhoeffer's 
early writings. The non-biblical language of Bonhoeffer's moral 
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theory is a development consistent with his correlation of 
theology and philosophy_ 
Dualism in Thought 
35 
Theology is a perspective on reality and implies a notion 
of truth which must be expressed in words. Inherent in Bonhoef-
fer's notion of Christology, the heart of his theology, is a 
conception of the relationship between faith and reason. Bon-
hoeffer's ethics is one instance of his attempt to show the 
falseness of any dichotomy between these two spheres. To him, 
the meaning of the Incarnation is the unity of all things "in 
Christ." Bonhoeffer's theology attempts to conceptualize this 
Christic synthesis. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
the basis of the correlation between theology and philosophy 
established in the development of Bonhoeffer1s ethical system 
and to see its application in at least one area--that of anthro-
pology. 
Bonhoeffer is a dialectical theologian o Method alone,com-
its him to the synthesis of diverse elements within his theology 
Thus, he is very critical of attempts to establish ontic bounda-
ries between the different domains of lifeo The antithesis of 
church and state, of supernatural and natural, of faith and 
reason is that type of dual thinking which could tolerate the 
olitical tyranny of Hitler and cripple the usefulness of the 
Confessing Church. The history of this dualism of thought and 
eing in Christian Bonhoeffer and 
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distinguished from his own position. 
Since the beginnings of Christian ethics after the times 
of the New Testament the main underlying conception in 
ethical thought and the one which consciously or uncon-
sciously has determined its whole course, has been the 
conception of a juxtaposition and conflict of two spheres, 
the one divine, holy, supernatural and Christian, and 
the other worldly, profane, natural and un-Christian. 
This view becomes dominant for the first time in the 
Middle Ages, and for the second time in the pseudo-Protes-
tant thought of the period after the Reformation. Real-
ity as a whole now falls into two parts, and the concern 
of ethics is the proper relation of these two parts to 
each other.l 
This trait of previous Christian ethical systems becomes a 
point of departure for Bonhoeffer. Such a conception is ntheolo-
gically speaking, to think in terms of laws,"2 while Bonhoeffer 
hopes to free the Christian from rules and principles for God's 
service. If ethics is split between "ought" and "is," between 
knowledge of good and evil, and between motives or consequences 
as the determinants of the good, then ethics has separated real-
ity and replaced its unity with a principle or a law of affinity. 
~n Christ, creation already has been reconciled. From Bonhoef-
~er's earliest address on ethics, he opposes any attempt to re-
~lace Christ's mediation with static norms. 
Ve will speak today of the basic questions raised by the 
demand for a Christian ethic, not by making the attempt 
to lay down generally valid, Christian norms and precepts 
in contemporary ethical questions--which in any case is 
completely hopeless--but rather by examining and entering 
into the characteristic trend of contemporary ethical 
problems in light of fundamental Christian ideas. The 
reason for a limitation of this nature lies in the fact, 
lEthics, p. 1960 
2Ibid., p. 199. 
that there are not and cannot3be Christian norms and principles of a moral nature. 
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The reason for such distrust of principles and absolutes in 
ethics is partly due to the moral flexibility required by the 
ecclesiastical struggle within Germany. Partly, the rejection of 
universal norms stems from their inadequacy in Bonhoeffer's 
experience. In both respects the attempt to structure behavior 
or determine the right course of action according to ~ priori 
norms only resulted in the indecision and mental paralysis of 
conflicting claims. Even if the norms were so-called 'Christiantt 
norms an obstructive deliberation about biblical interpretation 
and contradictory commandments resulted. The conscience operat-
ing on principles is a labyrinth of motives and consequences; it 
indicates a radical disunity in thoughto The fundamental reason 
for the insufficiency of universal precepts of morality is that 
they claim, implicitly, to grasp the eternal and infinite will of 
God. In effect, absolute directives and regulations split real-
ity into the good and the bad and define the relationship between 
themo This legalizes the will of God in the manner of the Phari-
4 sees and every such attempt ends with enslavement to the Law. 
"Ethical thinking in terms of the spheres then, is invalidated by 
the faith in the revelation of the ultimate reality in Jesus 
Christ. tt5 
3"What is a Christian Ethic?tt No Rus1z Swords, po 40. 
4"The Pharisee," Ethics, pp. 26-370 
5EthiCS, p. 2000 
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Besides the wish to avoid a dualism, Bonhoeffer's interest 
in the relationship of theology and philosophy follows upon the 
~ecessity of knowing and communicating the gospel. 
In ethics, as in dogmatics, we cannot simply reproduce 
the terminology of the Bible. The altered problems of 
ethics demand an altered terminology. But it must be 
remembered that an extension of the terminology igvolves 
the risk of slipping away from what is essential. 
~onhoeffer is aware that Christianity must be thought before it 
pan be communicated 0 This requires an epistemology of faith. 
~uch need is realized even when criticizing theologians for their 
philosophical usages, e.g., Tillich for his Existentialism? or 
Barth for his Kantianismo 8 
Bonhoeffer's second dissertation, ~ and Being, is a major 
attempt to relate theology and philosophy because of the needs of 
terminology. The central problem is "one of forming genuine 
theological concepts and choosing whether one is to use ontologi-
cal categories in explaining them or those of transcendental 
philosophy.tt9 The tentative conclusions of !£:!? and Being provide 
a context for the eventual definitions of theology and philosophy 
that Bonhoeffer proposed. 
The Definition of Theology and Philosophy 
UTheology is a function of the Church ••• theology is the 
6Ibid., p. 223. 
~. ?"Man in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology," !!2 Rusty 
owords, ppo 58-60. 
8Letters and Papers, p. 198 0 9Act and Being, po 12. 
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memory of the Church. ttlO It is "reflective knowledge in the 
service of the Churcho"ll Theology is once removed from that 
Actus Directus12 which is the cognitive act of belief and which 
is divinely effected. Theology's function is to clarify the 
transcendental revelation while realizing that it never grasps 
this act by its reflectiono This inability of the mind to con-
ceptualize the pure revelation of God is emphatic in the case of 
philosophy. "Per se, a philosophy cannot spare room for revela-
tion."13 Systematic philosophy attempts to grasp total reality 
but fails to do so because human nature has no potential, no 
capacity for this divine act. Reason is limited by that which is 
incomprehensible, i.e., God. Therefore the ground of reality is 
excluded from cognition. Critical philosophy attempts to limit 
reason by reason which only reasserts its essential ego-centric-
it Yo The method of both theology and philosophy is reflective 
analysis, but the former proceeds "from the truth," while the 
latter moves "to the truth." 
"Christian theology has to be conscious of its particular 
premise, that is, the premise of the reality of God.,,14 Philos-
ophy, on the other hand, begins with the attempt to prove the 
10Ibid. , p. 143. 
llIbid. , po 150 0 
l2Ibid • , pp. l8lf. 
l3Ibid • , p. 70. 
l4Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "The Christian Idea of God," Journal 
2! Religion, XII, 2 (April, 1932), po 1770 
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existence of God. Methods may be similar but these methods begin 
at radically different starting points. Theology starts with 
God, while philosophy attempts to reach Him by its inevitable 
presupposition that thought can find the truth and thus find Godo 
Theology scientifically considers the category of revelation and 
subjectively presupposes the state of faitho Because theology 
has a place for God, it is the critique of all philosophy, which 
is inescapably restricted to the mental forms and incapable of 
the infinite. Theology, beginning with God-given knowledge can 
conclude that "no religion, no ethics, no metaphysical knowledge 
may serve to approach God. They are all under the judgment of 
God, they are the works of man. ,,15 
Philosophy clarifies the modes of reflection, and, as such, 
it is useful to theology. Moreover, in accepting a systematiza-
tion of concepts a theologian inevitably associates himself with 
some philosophy. However, Bonhoeffer holds that even in its 
capacity of linguistic analysis, philosophy "cannot be understood 
without a theological background and therefore cannot provide any 
axiomatic interpretation of the theologicaloooo"16 Ultimately, 
philosophical modes of thought are based on theological insights, 
while theology has data that evaluates all systematic thought as 
curvum in ~ corruptio mentis. l ? Thus, the relation of Chris-
15Ibid ., p. 1850 
16No Rusty Swords, p. 980 
l? t1 Self centered, the corruption of the mindol! No Rusty 
Swords, po 3?0. 
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tian theology to philosophy is not static or determined; it is 
not the case that one specific philosophical terminology is 
necessary for the statement of revelation. Theology begins with 
divine knowledge, i.e., revelation as one instance of truth that 
is imposed, free and objective. The theologian can utilize any 
philosophy that is humble and obedient to this intuition of 
faith. 
The question of the proper mode of theological expression 
can be restated as: Is there a Christian philosophy? Bonhoeffer 
would answer that whatever philosophy is not closed to revelation 
is Christian. The only restriction on philosophical systems is 
that they be critical, that they recognize their ineptness beside 
the divine reality and make no claim to the final word on truth. 
The discussion on the relationship of theology and philos-
ophy has centered on epistemology. Bonhoeffer's opinion is that 
both theology and philosophy affirm reality as their proper 
object, and the mode of knowing for each is systematico However, 
the theory of knowledge that theology develops is consciously 
open to God while philosophy necessarily excludes the infinite 
God. Bonhoeffer develops this character of theological cognition 
by considering its three-fold reception of revelation. 
In understanding this [revelation] we first need to 
distinguish between three ways of knowing ••• knowing as 
a believer, knowing in preaching, and theological know-
ledge, of which the first may be called existential and 
the others ecclesiastical cognition. i8 
l8Act and Being, p. 1370 
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Existential knowing is never captured in reflection; it is the 
intuition of the person of Christ and is a divine gift. If 
rationality grasps the divine reality, then ethics becomes a way 
from man to God; the mediation of the Word of God and the fact 
of grace would be superfluous. "Thought, even theological th~t 
will always be systematic by nature and can therefore never com-
prehend the living person of Christ .. ,,19 And yet ecclesiastical 
knowledge is different from philosophical modes of thought 
because "there is obedient thinking and there is disobedient 
thinkingo,,20 Theology, therefore, entails ~ posteriori forms of 
knowing while those of philosophy are "disobedient" because they 
are ~ priori. 
Although not as pronounced as the epistemological discussion 
on theology and philosophy, there is a definite metaphysical 
position underlying Bonhoeffer's correlation. Bonhoeffer means 
to use an ontological as well as cognitive analysis of theology 
and philosophy. One facet of Bonhoeffer's theology is concerned 
with the possibilities of Natural Theology, that philosophical 
discipline which most closely approximates theological study. 
Bonhoeffer denies the existence of a rational approach to God, 
not only because it is a hopeless attempt to comprehend the 
Infinite, but because there is no chain of being that will sup-
port this analogia entis. God cannot be an object of philosophi-
19Ibid ., po 146. 
20Idem • 
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cal thought because He has no metaphysical relationship to crea-
tion. "Creator and creature cannot be said to have a relation of 
cause and effect, for between Creator and creature there is nei-
ther a law of motive nor a law of effect nor anything else. Be-
tween Creator and creature there is simply nothing: the void.,,21 
It is impossible to speak of teleology or causality in this 
fallen world as either a cognitive or metaphysical approach to 
God, because only the will of God incarnate in the Son of God can 
effect such an approach. Bonhoeffer proposes an "analogy of re-
lationshiptl and the Itorders of Preservation" since the natural 
structures of thought and being tlhave no value in themselves. 
They are accomplished and have purpose only through Christ."22 
Thus, Bonhoeffer excludes philosophy from certain subject matter, 
i.e., an Infinite Being, for reasons that will be seen to have 
consequences within his ethics. 
It is evident that ultimately the question of the relation 
of theology and philosophy is one of Christology. In the final 
analysis both stand on the judgment of God. Any definition that 
~ight oppose these modes of reflection is indicative of dUalistic 
~hinking or thought in terms of two spheres. Even though the 
pharacter of theology is revelational while philosophy is ration-
aI, Bonhoeffer maintains that "The 'supernatural' is only in the 
21Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: Temptation, ed. 
Eberhard Bethge, trans. John E. Fletcher and Kathleen Downham 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), po 180 
22Ibid., p. 880 
44 
natural, the holy only in the profane, and the revelational only 
in the rational.,,23 Christ is the unity that draws all seeming 
opposites together. Theology and philosophy are not identical, 
but both realize their truth and being only as facets of the 
"new creation" in Christ. Note that Bonhoeffer justifies his 
definition of these two disciplines by an appeal to faith; his 
formulation of ethics will be sustained by a similar appeal. 
The autonomy and isolation of reason is Bonhoeffer's philo-
sophical objection to an independent science of philosophy. 
"This fact of the captivity of human thinking within itself, that 
is to say, of its inevitable autocracy and self glorification as 
it is found in philosophy, can be interpreted theologically as 
the corruption of the mind, which is caused by the first Fall.,,24 
The state of man's mind only demonstrates the ontological condi-
tion of man in statu corruptionis. Theology begins with revela-
tion, and so it can grasp the impact of the Original Sin and the 
Redemption on human nature, just as it realizes the difference 
between actus reflectus and actus directus in the mind. tlBecause 
our existence is not in unity our thinking is torn apart as 
well",,25 
Anthropology 
If one is to question either man himself or the works of man 
23Ethics, po 198. 
24t1The Christian Idea of God,1t p. 178. 
25Creation and Fall, p. 570 
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such as theology and philosophy, with ultimate seriousness, he 
must inquire before God. Every attempt of reason is limited to 
its own structures and therefore every philosophical anthropology 
defines the nature of man simply by the manner in which it asks 
~ts questions. If man attempts to know himself from his possi-
~ilities or his limitations, the two alternatives open to ration-
~l psychology, he cannot escape the fact that he is a part of the 
~uestiono In Bonhoeffer's mind, the attempt by philosophy to 
~efine human nature is the futile attempt of thought to transcend 
~hought, and of man to transcend himself by objectifying himself. 
fl1'hilosophy, therefore, means the question of man and its answer 
~ll in one,fl 26 since it is man's effort, figuratively, to lift 
pimself by his bootstraps. 
The philosophical problem of man has developed from the 
~xperience of his achievements and limits. This polarity is an 
~bstraction from that theological understanding which begins from 
~he pervasive unity of Christ the God-man. To Bonhoeffer, any 
~ssential definition to man that does not account for his inten-
~ional relationship to God is an instance of the splitting of 
reality into two dimensions. ItNothing can be known of either God 
pr man before God has become man in Jesus Christ. fl27 Thus, it is 
~n Christ that humanity finds its proper proportiono 
26No Rusty Swords, p. 51 •. 
27Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ The Center, ed. Eberhard 
Bethge, trans. John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 
p. 105. 
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The primordial sin changed man's nature because it changed 
God's relationship to mano Original Sin disuni£ied human nature 
and severed it £rom its origin and destiny. In this corrupted 
state, man's essence is sin. 28 On the other hand, Redemption is 
a new creation, and re-establishes the truth o£ human nature as 
creaturehood. The man of £aith has a new nature. In short, "The 
being of man has no £ormal, metaphysical, psychological proper-
ties dissociable £rom the proposition that 'man is either in 
Christ or in Adam,.tt29 
The theological anthropology thus advocated by Bonhoe££er is 
~ased on biblical, Lutheran inSights. This conception o£ human 
~ature is consistent with his rejection o£ any duality in reality 
and his correlation o£ theology and philosophy. Grace and sin 
~re ontological categories to Bonhoe££er and £orm the ground £or 
~he Christian concept o£ man's being. Faith gives evidence which 
~nterprets and harmonizes all other evidence concerning cosmolo~ 
epistemology and anthropology. The absolute and unrestricted 
~ill o£ God constitutes all nature by its £ree acceptance or 
~ejection. Yith this voluntaristic conception o£ God30 "all 
28n'In Adam' means in untruth, in culpable perversion o£ the 
twill (the human essence) inwards to the sel£--.£,2£ eurvum in ~.n 
~ ~ Being, p. 156. 
29 Ibid., p. 148. 
30It is not the purpose o£ this chapter to discuss this 
~oluntaristic notion o£ God except £or its importance as a pre-
supposition of much o£ Bonhoe££er's work on the correlation o£ 
~heology and philosophy. This assertion may be verified in Crea-
tion and Fall, pp. 38-39, and No Rusty Swords, p. 46. In The---
communIOn of Saints, p. 31, BoDhoe£fer criticizes Idealism~ 
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metaphysical ideas of eternity and time, being and becoming, 
living and dying, essence and appearance must be compatible.,,31 
Thus, man's being is determined by its unity with or separation 
from the plan of God as "being-in-Christ" or "being-in-Adam. tI 
It should be recognized that Bonhoeffer's understanding of 
the will of God as contained in the person of Christ is fund a-
mental to his conception of the nature of man and the ethical 
dimensions of that nature. Neither nature nor any operation of 
nature has any ontological status or value in~. The uncondi-
tioned, unmotivated freedom of God is Bonhoeffer's premise in 
reconciling the two spheres. It is a necessary premise for mak-
ing faith prior to the fruitful and proper use of reason and for 
denying a doctrine of analogy32 that would give human nature an 
intrinsic goodness. If man is conceived to have some independent 
inherent teleology, or if human actions can be categorized as 
objectively good or bad, then the will of God has been restricted 
and determined. Bonhoeffer objects to any general theory of 
being which denies the contingency of God's revelation or estab-
lishes a human reality that is independent of God's eternally new 
decisiono Such conceptions would deny the freedom of God. 
In his discussion of the relation of theology and philosophy 
ethics and anthropology for having "no voluntarist concept of 
Godo" It is the will of God that imposes obligations upon man 
and constitutes the truth value of human reason rather than some 
ontological structure. 
31Act and Being, po 1720 
32Ibid., ppo 68-69. 
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Bonhoeffer opts for a Christian use of reason. Therefore, when 
he discusses the nature of man, Bonhoeffer proposes a theological 
anthropology. Both of these assumptions are the result of what 
Bonhoeffer considers to be the Christian idea of Godo Man is 
what the infinite and transcendent God now wants him to beo The 
Christian concept of the person is man-after-the-Fall, and is the 
only notion which is consistent with the "absolute distinction 
between God and man. ";.; The moment of faith is regarded as the 
revelation of this absolute difference. Belief establishes man's 
being as being "in Christ" and becomes the central reference 
point for Bonhoeffer's ethics. Belief recovers the unity of man 
with his origin and destiny and therefore Christian ethics can 
speak to the whole man. An ethic based on this anthropology, 
furthermore, intends not to call man to some ideal or "other-
worldliness" but to be truly humano 
By asserting the void between Creator and creature, Bon-
hoeffer means to confirm their unity and reconciliation in the 
life of Christo The final "oneness" of reality in the Incarna-
tion has a crucial function for Bonhoeffer's ethical purposeso 
~ system that opposes faith and reason by constructing an ethic 
of pietism or formalism is clearly invalid. The irresponsibility 
~ngendered by thinking in terms of two dimensions and universal 
~rinciples is overcome. In this framework, deputyship cannot 
end at some artificial boundary. Furthermore, if the proper 
33The Communion of Saints, p. 31. 
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being of man is "in Christ," there is an anthropological basis 
for both faith and reason to provide ethical direction as well 
as a foundation for non-biblical terminology in Christian ethicso 
In summary, Bonhoeffer was a theologian whose idea of God 
prompted him to assert an infinite gap between God and the world. 
On the other hand, Bonhoeffer's concept of the Word of God com-
mitted him to reconcile all in Christo He maintained a "polemic 
unity ft34 between thought open to grace (theology) and thought 
closed to grace (philosophy); just as there is a polemic unity 
of being-in-Christ and being-in-Adam. However, it is important 
to realize that the point of unity is given by faith. Only be-
lief in Christ specifies the proper use of philosophy; only 
faith shows the true nature of man. There could be no science 
of morality independent of the data of Revelation. It remains 
to be seen what real significance that reason or non-biblical 
evidence can have within Bonhoeffer's ethico The relationship 
between theology and philosophy, between the supernatural and the 
natural, is not one of equals. Reason seems to be dependent and 
subjugated to faith. It is necessary therefore, to investigate 
very closely the attempts of Bonhoeffer to account for the 
rational and the natural within his ethics. It remains a ques-
tion whether the tension felt within the theoretical foundations 
of Bonhoeffer's relationship of theology and philosophy will 
occur in the practice of his Ethics. 
34Ethics, p. 199. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DISTINCTION OF PENULTIMATE-ULTIMATE 
IN BONHOEFFER'S ETHIC 
Bonhoeffer spoke in terms of the penultimate-ultimate dis-
tinction when he attempted to specify the place of reason in 
ethics. In Bonhoeffer's view, faith was not opposed to reasono 
Rather, the unity of all life's dimensions in Christ prompted 
Bonhoeffer to analyse the exact relationship between the in-
sights given by Revelation and those given by rational delibera-
tiono He hoped to revitalize the concept of the "natural" withiI 
Lutheran moral theology by the categories of the penultimate and 
the ultimateo These same categories make the temporal situation 
essential to the consideration of moral "behavior. In effect, thE 
penultimate-ultimate distinction attempts to conciliate a natura] 
law theory and a situation ethico 
In the preceding analysis of Bonhoeffer's relation of faith 
and reason, and his exposition of human nature, the premises of 
his Christian ethics were giveno Bonhoeffer insists upon the 
foundation of Christology but equally upon the affinity of Chris-
tianity and humanism o It is only by faith that man attains the 
ultimate perspective that makes his activity ethically signifi-
cant. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to see the concrete 
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ethical program proposed by Bonhoeffer on the basis of these 
hypotheses. The definition and meaning of the "ethical," the 
place of faith in moral discourse and, finally, the attempt of 
Bonhoeffer to make the natural orders ethically relevant will be 
the order of study. 
The Problem of Ethics 
- -
It is important to understand the problems that Bonhoeffer 
hoped to alleviate with his ethical proposals. The protiem usu-
ally determines the character of the remedy. The estimation of 
Bonhoeffer's achievements in Ethics is vitally connected with the 
difficulties that he considered in its formulation. The positive 
and negative elements which are organized into Bonhoeffer's defi-
nition of ethics are pivotal to any interior criticism, as they 
are the criteria he himself sets for the evaluation of his ethicso 
A theological foundation for ethics was a progressive con-
cern within the wider development of Bonhoeffer's theology. His 
aim of showing the concrete nature of revelation logically con-
cluded with the study of morality. Thus, there is a strictly 
theological purpose to Ethics. "The problem of Christian ethics 
is the realization among God's creatures of the revelational 
reality of God in Christ, just as the problem of dogmatics is the 
truth of the revelational reality of God in Christ." l In this 
sense, Ethics is Bonhoefferts attempt to summarize his thought 
lEthics, p. 190. 
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by drawing the conclusions and implications of his initial posi-
tions on the nature of the Church and Christology. 
Moreover, the Lutheran concern with the relationship of 
Gospel and Law--the dogma of justification by faith--was another 
theoretical problemo The study during the Finkenwalde period had 
not resolved the exegetic difficulties of the significance of the 
commandments and ethical directives in the gospel. Law is enig-
matic since Christ proclaimed the Christian's freedom from the 
law. The nature of a Christian commandment needed exposition if 
faith and not works was to be the criterion of salvation. 
Besides these methodological aims, Bonhoeffer's experience 
convinced him of the failure of previous ethics. Not the absence 
but the abundance of ethical systems contributed to the moral 
confusion of the era of the Great Depression and the two World 
Wars. The problematic was evident to him in the success of Hit-
ler and the advent of the Third Reich. The ethical attitudes 
which history proved to be ineffective also contributed to Bon-
hoeffer's positive hopes for his ethics. The ethical systems 
that attempted tohandle Nazism were like "rusty swordse,,2 Bon-
hoeffer compares them to the figure of Don Quixote, dressed in 
ridiculous armour and fighting for a non-existent ladyo On two 
occasions3 Bonhoeffer itemized the ethical systems that history 
had tested and broken. Rationalism is too idealistic to have a 
2Ibido, p. 680 
3Letters and Papers, pp. 17-19, and Ethics, ppo 65-670 
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concrete effect on the world. Moral fanaticism is more concernea 
with virtue than the conditions which make it possible and so is 
entangled in non-essentials. Devotion to conscience results in 
indecision and ineffectiveness. Duty ends in avoiding responsi-
bility and a slavish imitation of the past. If freedom is one's 
sole ethical principle it becomes self-assertion since it is an 
immature criterion of choosing among alternativeso In essence, 
each of these attitudes is imitation of the Law, and confines 
ethics to the limits of some principle. The history of ethical 
theory, therefore, is a negative factor contributing to Bonhoef-
fer's purposes in moral theology. Bonhoeffer, however, sees the 
need for the gospel in liberating man for a creative encounter 
with changing circumstances. 
These theoretical and practical difficulties with ethics 
should be considered in the light of Bonhoeffer's aim of recon-
ciling all the facets of life into the reality of Christ. He is 
stating his goals and expectations when he says that "after 
Christ, Ethics can have but one purpose, namely, the achievement 
of participation in the reality of the fulfilled will of God.,,4 
Ethics, then, is that science which determines the way that "the 
present is taken up by God in Christ.,,5 
Conformation 
Bonhoeffer's notion of the problems with past ethical 
4Ethics, p. 212. 
5ill£., po 89. 
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theories is explanatory of the means he formulated to overcome 
them. . Central to his technique is the concept of "conformation. I 
Conformation is the goal of morality. Reality has a structure 
and so do ethical systems; the Christian structure is Christ. 
But conformation should not be understood as a pietistic "being 
like Christ" but rather it is that inner transformation that 
actually accomplishes the immediate mind and work of Christ. 
Just as Bonhoeffer objects to an ethic of universal prinCiples, 
he opposes any attempt to make the gospel a new law or norm to 
impose arbitrarily upon the changing world. Christian ethics is 
a formative process which realizes the shape of Christ in today's 
world. Conformation is not a process that subjugates all the 
natural forms of life, but rather accepts them all within the 
teleology of Christ. As an ethical term, conformation is that 
style of human life which is most truly human and whose expres-
sion is the most adequate to all the dimensions of reality. Bon-
hoeffer's theory of conformation attempts to specify the ethical 
funct,ion of faith. 
Conformation is the program that combines simplicity and 
wisdom, and by so doing replaces the ineffective ethics of the 
past. Simplicity is that being-in-Christ which was mentioned as 
the anthropological basis of Bonhoeffer's ethics. It is that 
single-mindedness that searches only the will of God for guidance 
Because the simple man 11100ks only to God, without any sidelong 
glance at the world, he is able to look at the reality of the 
world freely and without prejudice o And that is how simplicity 
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becomes wisdomo fl6 Conformation is effected by the harmony of 
both the divine and the natural in human behavior. 
The divine effectiveness in conformation is expressed by 
Bonhoeffer's sections on the commandments. The commandment of 
God is the object of Christian ethics,? because it is the founda-
tion of the "ethical." It is the light of permission that cuts 
through the dark motives and desires of the conscience. It must 
not be fragmented into various ethical directions but be realized 
as "the permission to live as man before God. The commandment 
of God is permissiono It differs from all human laws in that it 
commands freedom. uB Moreover, the fact of the divine commandment 
establishes forms of superiority and inferiority all through life 
This structure is the warrant or authority for any ethical dis-
cussion. 
Conformation as based on the command of Christ demonstrates 
Bonhoeffer's requirement for a social perspective in ethics. 
Ethics is not written by or for the isolated individual strug-
gling alone with his decisions. There is no ethical behavior in 
isolation. The locus of conformation in Christ is a visible 
community. 
Ethics as formation is possible only upon the foundation 
of the form of Jesus Christ which is present in His 
Church 0 The Church is the place where Jesus Christ's 
6Ibid., po 680 
?Ibid., p. 2?? 
8Ibid., p. 281. 
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taking form is proclaimed and accomplished. It is this 
proclamation and this event that Christian ethics is 
designed to serve09 
The ethical choice is never secluded since it takes shape in a 
situation that is essentially social by revelational precept. 
When explaining the meaning of conformation, Bonhoeffer 
shows that his theory is a type of "situation ethic. tI "Ethical 
problems of content can never be discussed in a Christian light; 
there is simply no possibility of erecting generally valid prin-
ciples, because each moment lived in God's sight, can bring an 
unexpected decision."lO A timeless, placeless ethic is adoles-
cent; the splitting of human possibilities into good and bad is 
immature. Any system that gives general validity to moral prin-
ciples does not realize the infinite variation of the form of 
Christ's commandment in history. The respect for each situation 
which denies a systematic knowledge of right and wrong is evident 
in The ~ of Discipleship and its attempt to explicate the Ser-
mon on the Mount. The life of discipleship forbids an abstract 
ethic but requires obedience in the concrete situation. "To fol-
low in his steps is something that is void of all contento It 
gives us no intelligible programme for a way of life, no goal or 
ideal to strive aftere"ll The configuration with Christ is not 
an alien mold, shaping man according to this ideal or that end, 
9Ibid ., p. 88. 
lO"What is a Christian Ethic?", !!,o Rusty Swords, po 460 
llCost of Discipleship, p. 620 
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but is the real form of man in historyo 
"Responsibility" is the human element in conformation; it is 
the human acceptance and accomplishment of God's will. Respon-
sibility is that freedom which refuses to hide behind principles, 
or authorize one's behavior by anything other than one's personal 
judgment. The responsible person knows ethical success in the 
risk of action and not in intense deliberation. "Responsibility 
is the total and realistic response to the claim of God and of 
our neighbor, ••• it shows in its true light how the response of a 
conscience which is bound by principles is only a partial one. tt12 
Responsibility realizes the freedom of obedience to the form of 
Christ, and accepts only the genuine obligations of divine man-
date and human need. Conscience is an isolating factor, and in-
capacitates man with norms and rules. However, man's conscience 
is freed and unified by Simplicity and wisdom when it is informed 
by Christ. The responsible man willingly incurs the guilt resul-
ting from the law broken in response to Christian values. Final 
judgment on motives or consequences is not given by an indivi-
dual's sense of righteousness. "The man who acts in the freedom 
of his own most personal responsibility is precisely the man who 
sees his action finally committed to the guidance of God.,,13 
This is the meaning of Luther's dictum to sin boldly, but believe 
more boldly. 
l2Ethics, p. 245. 
l3Ibid., p. 249. 
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Bonhoeffer gives an example of the contextual and social 
character of conformation in his chapter on "What is meant by 
'Telling the Truth?' ,,14 Truth is different in different situa-
tions; the truth value of a statement depends on the relation-
ship, place, context, subject matter, etc., in which it occurs. 
The truth between a parent and a child is often a lie outside of 
the family. Telling the truth is not just a matter of moral 
character or conscience; it cannot be defined as the correspon-
dence of the mental and verbal. Absolute factual statement often 
can be cynical and cruel whereas the truth is "also a matter of 
correct appreciation of real situations and of serious reflec-
tion upon them. ,,15 
The responsibility to tell the truth cannot be defined out-
side of the interpersonal situation that demands it. Objective 
structures of the lower and the higher are sociological fact. 
This framework of natural hierarchies is justified by divine 
command, and accepted in the manifold personal relationships of 
authority and obedience as the ethical domain. "The ethical is 
not essentially a formal, rational principle but a concrete rela-
tion between the giver and the receiver of commands. ,,16 There-
fore, truth is required and specified by the authority preserved 
in the order of nature from its corresponding subordinate. 
14Ibid., pp. 363-3720 
15Ibid., p. 3640 
16Ibid., p. 2730 
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Furthermore, the warrant or authorization for all ethical discus-
sion depends upon the existence of an Itoffice" or a polarity of 
authority and obedience in society. The truth value of a state-
ment depends not only upon "what" is said but upon "who" says it. 
Bonhoeffer's theory of conformation makes the situation a 
relevant factor in moral considerations. However, it would be a 
misunderstanding of Bonhoefferts doctrine to think that the con-
text signifies the subjective and radically particular quality 
of each moral choice.17 Rather, the situation is an objective 
factor in ethical decisions and can be sociologically analysed. 
The "situation" of ethical discussion is always the concrete form 
of human life which is established by divine decree. The rela-
tionships intrinsic to the natural life are those forms or commu-
nal structures which state the place and location of man's rights 
and duties. The ethical demands relationships of superiority and 
inferiority, of rights and obligations, of freedom and obedience. 
The natural world contains divinely commissioned orders that 
correlate permission and prohibition and provide the warrant for 
ethical discourse in these areas. These authority-obedience 
forms are called ttmandates tl by Bonhoeffer, and they specify the 
situational aspects of conformation. 
17Joseph Fletcher criticises Bonhoeffer for legalism and 
casuistry which is contrary to the "situational" character of 
Ethics. Cf. Situation Ethics: ~ ~ Morality (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1966), p. 38. Fletcher has simply not 
understood the dogmatic sociology implied by Bonhoeffer's mean-
ing of the term "context" or Itsituation.ft 
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This relativeness of the world to Christ assumes concrete 
form in certain mandates of God in the world. The Scrip-
ture names four such mandates: labour, marriage, govern-
ment and the church. 18 We speak of the divine mandates 
rather than of divine orders because the word mandate 
refers more clearly to a divinely imposed task rather 
than to a determination of being. It is God's will that 
there shall b~ labour, marriage, government and church 
in the worldo 1 9 
God's commandment--the basis of all right and duty because it is 
the basis of man's relationship to God--confronts man in four 
different but unified forms. These mandates are the commission 
that gives the Christian freedom, since obedience in the context 
of labour, marriage, government and the church establish a con-
crete relationship to the Transcendent. The dynamism and vital-
ity of the mandates when regarded as tasks instead of as metaphy-
sical determinations or orders, locate man's ethical responsibil-
itieso The mandates express tithe reality of the love of God for 
the world and for men.,,20 The function of the mandates is Bon-
hoeffer's most concrete effort to block any "Christian tt retreat 
from the secular. 
The structure of the responsible life--its correspondence 
with reality, freedom, social awareness, willingness to accept 
guilt and obedience--is the many-sided attitude of the Christian 
to his vocation of conformation with Christ as received in baptism 
18Bonhoeffer is slightly inconsistent in his specification 
of the mandates. A later consideration in Ethics lists them as 
the church, marriage, culture and government. (p. 286f.) 
19Ethics, p. 207. 
20Ibido, p. 288. 
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To the individual, the orders of this world are a responsibility; 
to Christ's view, they are a calling. One's vocation is that 
place where deputyship is exercised, where God's commandment is 
heard. The notion of conformation reconciles these different 
areas of activity commanded in Christ and accomplished in respon-
sibilityo Conformation is the end of ethics; the mandates are 
the Christian's means for formation in Christ. Bonhoeffer's 
ethical program, then, opens the door to eontent,21 i.eo, natural 
values. 
~ Ultimate and Penultimate 
Formalism, as an ethical approach, was susceptible to the 
disjunction of intention and execution. Bonhoeffer rejected this 
position that good intentions alone make a person moral. Formal-
ism had been used by Christians to justify their avoidance of the 
political questions of the Third Reich. In fact, formalism led 
Karl Barth to a "position of revelation.,,22 Bonhoeffer's concept 
of conformation, however, includes an experiential and theologi-
cal effort to account for the world and express this concern in 
non-biblical language. The form of Christ is specified by the 
Christic structure of life. Thus, Bonhoefferts most concrete 
21The denial of content for Christian ethics that Bonhoeffer 
requested in his Barcelona lecture (Supra, p. 55f.) was modified 
by the time Ethics was written. His objections to Kantian forma-
lism and his growing desire to concretize revelation are opera-
tive in the specific precepts contained in his final work on 
ethics. 
22Letters and Papers, p. 1980 
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proposals for a new ethic are centered upon his attempt to incor-
porate the preserved orders of the natural world into moral dis-
cussions. "One of his distinctive contributions to theological-
ethical terminology is the paired concepts of the 'ultimate' and 
the 'penultimate·.,,23 
The ultimate--faith and divine justification--may not oblit-
erate the penultimate or those conditions that are the ~ qua 
~ of belief. The ultimate or conformation is the end of ethi-
cal behavior while the penultimate is the means o The form of 
Christ is achieved only within the natural and the rationalo 
Faith is never realized except in and through the historical and 
material preamble. The Lutheran doctrine of the justification of 
the sinner by faith alone--this is the last word, the ultimate of 
Christian life. However, "the Christian life means neither a 
destruction nor a sanctioning of the penultimateo In Christ the 
reality of God meets the reality of the world and allows us to 
share in this real encountero,,24 
The relationship and nature of the penultimate as regards 
the ultimate is crucial to the understanding of one of Bonhoef-
fer's aims. He wishes to put content and circumstance into ethWs 
and ope~morality to the Christian appreciation of the worldo As 
is consistent with Bonhoeffer's Christology and dialectical 
23Franklin Eugene Sherman, "The Problem of a 'Trinitarian 
Social Ethic rn (Unpublished PhoDo dissertation; Dept. of Theolog~ 
University of Chicago), po 142. 
24Ethics, p. 133. 
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method, the point of intersection is the reality of Christ who 
loved the fallen world and re-directed it towards the unity of 
the divine volition. 
The penultimate is not a state or condition in it-
self, but it is a judgment which the ultimate passes upon 
that which has preceded it. Concretely, two things are 
called penultimate in relation to the justification of 
the sinner by grace, namely, being man and being good ••• 
For the sake of the ultimate the penultimate must be pre-
servedo Any arbitrary destruction of the penultimate 
will do serious injury to the ultimateo 25 
In considering this relationship it is helpful to remember 
Bonhoeffer's previous study of the relation of ends and means in 
The Cost of Discipleship. He advised that ends should always be 
the summation and total of their constitutive elements. A con-
clusion is reached only through the necessary process of premise 
and reasoning. A statement's truth depends on the data that pre-
cedes it. A declaration, for instance, that man knows nothing, 
is valid only if it is the "answer to a sum,tI and "the outcome 
of long experience. n26 Only a life of diligent study can lead to 
such a declaration. When such an assertion is made by a college 
freshman to excuse academic laziness, the conclusion becomes a 
premise, breaking the necessary sequence of ends to means. With-
out the proper warrant, a directive invalidates itselfo Thus, 
. 
the ultimate is what it is, the last word, only if it is preceded 
by the penultimate. 
To make the function of the penultimate relevant within 
25Ibid., ppo 133-340 
26Cost of DiSCipleship, p. 55. 
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Christian ethics and to realize its importance as an ethical cri-
terion, Bonhoeffer introduced the concept of the "natural" into 
Protestant ethics. The natural gives shape to the penultimate. 
The natural is "the form of life preserved by God for the fallen 
world and directed towards justification, redemption and renewal 
through Christ. The natural is, therefore, determined according 
to its form and according to its contents."27 In other words, 
the natural is not the antithesis of the supernatural. This 
would split reality into two forms. The natural should be con-
trasted to the unnatural which is that chaotic element in the 
fallen world which opposes Christian direction. The natural is 
the form immanent to life and is an end and a means; it suggests 
active participation in the orders of preservation and creature-
hood. As an end, the natural has inherent rights; as a means it 
has duties imposed upon it. 
Before considering the rights and obligations of the natural~ 
however, it is necessary to determine the extent of man's know-
ledge of the natural. Does human reason comprehend the orders of 
preservation? In effect, the natural is the human knowing of the 
"things before the last" or the penultimate. Reason is man's 
recognition of the penultimate as natural; it is the form of con-
sciousness which corresponds to the form of being of the preservec 
world. Reason also is fallen and as an order of the natural has 
no privileged or essential grasp of reality. Bonhoeffer limits 
27 Ethics, po 1450 
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the mind to perceiving only the content, not the purpose or ~orm, 
of creationo Perception is universalized by reason yet without 
reaching the formal determination, i.e., the divine orientation, 
of the naturalo The inevitable conclusion to such a view is 
drawn by Bonhoef~er in refusing to accept the rational as an au-
thority on the natural or the possibility of a rational certitude 
of its ethical norms. "The natural can never be something that 
is determined by any single part or any single authority within 
the ~allen world.,,28 The natural is adequately known by God 
alone 0 
In spite of this analysis of the rational, Bonhoe~~er does 
speak o~ universal rights, duties and relationships which are 
natural. These universals are, in some way, ethically relevant, 
since their denial or perversion is the unnatural element of the 
world which distorts the will o~ God. However, the misrepresen-
tation of some element of the natural is discovered by the self-
corrective quality of natural life rather than rational analysis-
~ posteriori not ~ priori. Unified by the necessity of the pen-
ultimate, these rights, duties and relationships are the form of 
natural life. 
Th~rights of natural life are explicated in terms of the 
principle flsuum cuique: to each his own$u 29 Respect for this 
principle is penultimate since it is due regard for the gifts of 
the Creator. Suum cuique is that dictum of Roman Law which is 
28Ibid ., p. 1470 
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the highest possible achievement of reason. This precept reaches 
the real privileges bestowed on natural lire, without reaching 
God who authorizes them. Under this norm Bonhoeffer considers 
the natural rights of bodily life, and intended to analyse the 
natural rights of the lire of the mind, the natural right to work 
and property, to fellowship, piety, happiness, mental and bodily 
self-defense. 30 Two things should be noted at this point; first, 
that Bonhoeffer gives concrete judgments on concrete issues such 
as euthanasia, suicide, and murder; secondly, Bonhoeffer's analy-
sis of the penultimate makes it the place of legitimate consider-
ation of moral principles and norms o This is a development of 
Bonhoeffer's earliest statement on ethics at Barcelona when he 
denied that any action could be called good or bad before its 
execution and that any principle could have general validity. 
The universal duties of natural life are implied by the 
rights. Man's recognition of the rights of his nature necessi-
tates the response to other men that can be categorized as re-
sponsibility or deputyship. The rights of the individual are 
also the rights of the entire natural order and thus prohibit 
self-assertion and demand altruism. Responsibility is the free 
accepta~e of the obligation imposed by the "other's" rights. 
Itpertinence" is the obligation placed on one by the nature of 
inanimate things0 31 Duties give prohibition and rights give 
30Bonhoerfer's outline for these chapter headings is extant, 
whereas he did not have time to complete these sections. Ethics, 
p. 186, n. 220 
31Ibid., ppo 235-360 
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permission; they must remain together or ethics deteriorates to 
"the Kantian ethic of dutY.o.or to the ethic of irresponsible 
genius.,,32 The right to self-preservation is balanced by the 
maxim that "all deliberate killing of innocent life is arbi-
trary.n33 The rights of marriage and reproduction necessarily 
imply the duties of a familyo 
Bonhoeffer's casuistry is the concrete application of his 
conception of the will of God as realized in definite and visible 
structures within human history. This insight provided Bonhoef-
fer with dogmatic and corrective goals for his ethical system. 
He attempted to reconcile the gospel and law, to account for the 
rational and the situation within ethical decisions, and to 
stimulate his fellow Christians to a more dynamic and social 
awareness of moral responsibility. Christology was the unifying 
element of Bonhoeffer's ethic, while the distinction between the 
ultimate and the penultimate was his working principle. This 
distinction was analysed and explicated in terms of the natural 
and the mandates, that is, in terms which were intelligible to 
"man come of ageo" However, the fusion of diverse elements and 
purposes within the ethical theory of Bonhoeffer, gives his 
system &p eclectic character and poses the problem of internal 
consistency. 
32Ibid., p. 251. 
33~o, p. 1600 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUE 
Bonhoeffer was a Christian writing an ethics for Christianso 
This fact is the strength and weakness of his ethical formulao 
He attempted to show the relevance of faith to a free and fruit-
ful movement through life. He hoped to present ethical attitudes 
for the believer that would replace the ideologies that faltered 
in the changing world. He intended to integrate Christianity and 
everyday lifeo Bonhoeffer's life is evidence that such an ethic 
is not only livable, but that it is worth dying for. However, 
the Christian ethic of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is Christian, i.eo, 
supposes a Lutheran doctrine, and thus has a conditional and 
restricted application. Secondly, there is a lack of clarity in 
Bonhoeffer's explication. Bonhoeffer strains to include the 
rational and natural in a framework adapted to only one ethical 
criterion--the will of God. Finally, this chapter will try to 
establish that an irreconcilable tension exists between the dog-
. 
. 
matic foundations of Bonhoeffer's thought and the experiential 
needs that he attempted to incorporate into his moral theology. 
Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran theologian and his ethic is appli-
cable to that audience which shares his theological starting 
points 0 Dogmas such as the corruption of the mind and heart of 
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man by the Fall, that man is justified by faith and not by works 
and even that man ~ sin boldly but believe more boldly are the 
presuppositions of Bonhoeffer's formulations. Consequently, an 
acceptance of these religious tenets is prior to the unqualified 
reception of Bonhoeffer's ethical work. Bonhoeffer tries to find 
purely natural evidence for these dogmas by an analysis of the 
radical immanence of philosophy and the fundamental indecisive-
ness of conscience. But Bonhoeffer's ethic is ever a facet of 
his theology. Any unorthodox interest such as a non-biblical 
terminology for the "world come of age" or natural ethical cri-
teria is limited by the restrictions of his Lutheran premises. 
Ethics as formation is possible only upon the foundation 
of the form of Jesus Christ which is present in His 
Church 0 The Church is the place where Jesus Christ's 
taking form is proclaimed and accomplished. It is this 
proclamation and t~iS event that Christian ethics is 
designed to serve., 
This definition of ethics excludes all non-Christian moral 
theory from the realm of the ethicalo Ethical decision is that 
situation of solitude before the will of God, when the individual 
tries to exclude every criterion of judgment except the divine 
judgment., The ethical situation is not the clash of values or 
the conflict of moral principles or even the attempt to distin-
. 
guish good and evil; rather it is activity commanded by God. 
Ethics is not concerned with nought" or "should" but with the 
reality of Christ's present form. In effect, Bonhoeffer reserves 
ethics, in the true meaning of the word, for the domain of the 
IEthics, p. 88 0 
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ultimate~ Man is rendered ethical in the realm of faith and jus-
tification. This notion of ethics is fully consistent with the 
theological anthropology proposed by Bonhoeffer. If one is not 
fully man until the moment of faith, then neither are one's acti-
vities truly human until that time. The unbeliever has no poten-
tial for moral behavior in Bonhoeffer's theory. 
Ethics is not the attempt to determine the right and wrong 
of behavior prior to its execution. This sense of ethics is 
arbitrary. Bonhoeffer rejects ~ priori principles as a restric-
tion of the ethical to the limits of conscience, which is the 
voice of man's essential disunification in the Fall. Conscience, 
principles, rational analysis, experience--all these are penulti-
mate and belong to the realm of ethics only if they accept the 
") 
fact that "it is the ultimate which determines the penultimate. lI £:! 
The real ethical judgment is that one executed by the believer 
who commits his activity to the mercy of God. 
When Bonhoeffer says that the ethical is a "peripheral 
event" he means more than the sporadic experience of decision 
between good and evilo Man is not caught moment by moment in 
conscious choice between heaven or hell. However, Bonhoeffer 
would fupther regulate ethical language such as "ought" or tlmustfl 
to the divine commandments and the ethical situation to the 
authority-obedience situation presented only in the ultimateo 
The obligation of "shall II or "should" applies only to a 
peripheral situation, and this obligation is inwardly 
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disrupted, if from being a peripheral concept it is con-
verted into a pedagogical method. "Shall tl or Itshould tl 
is always an "ultimate" word •• oIf the ethical ceases to 
be understood as an "ultimate" word, ••• its place is taken 
by a trite and jejune moralizationoooWhat suffers the 
decisive loss here is not merely the abundant fulness of 
life but the very essence of the ethical itself.3 
The importance of authorization for ethical consideration is 
yet another reason for claiming that the "ethical" in Bonhoeffer~ 
theory is a Christian dimension. Not only what is said but who 
says it is critical to ethics, since ethics is a relationship 
established by commands of a superior. In the end, "God's com-
mandment is the only warrant for ethical discourse.,,4 This 
authorization for ethics is granted only to Christian ethics and 
is considered only in terms of obedience or disobedience to the 
divine mandates. 
The origin of the whole problem of ethics is the Fall. Only 
Revelational ethics has knowledge of this event. Christian 
ethics alone knows the will of God as the sole determinant of the 
good, and recognizes the domain of ethical concern by the command 
of God. Theological ethics therefore is more than the fulfill-
ment of philosophical ethics--it is their denial. "The knowledge 
of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflection. 
The first task of the Christian ethics is to invalidate this 
knowledge.,,5 Thus, Bonhoeffer's ethics condemns the non-believer 
3Ibid., pp. 266-680 
4 Ibid., p. 2770 
5Ibid., p. 170 
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to the meaningless and frustrating dilemma of experiencing ethi-
cal problems without possessing the freedom or the knowledge to 
achieve a moral solution. Bonhoeffer, therefore, has no inten-
tion of formulating an ethic adequate to evaluate and guide 
behavior for the non-Christian. The clarity and consistency of 
Bonhoeffer's ideas must, therefore, be considered regarding those 
who share Bonhoeffer's Christian premise. 
Bonhoefferts Lutheran principles, his conception of the 
effects of Original Sin and the meaning of the Redemption in 
Christ are strongly operative in his definition of the ethical. 6 
However, Ethics and his Letters and Papers from Prison show a 
development within Bonhoefferts thought which tried seriously to 
account for the relative autonomy of the world, and the corres-
ponding relative validity of purely "natural" ethicso The ulti-
mate does not deny the penultimate; the Christian must respect 
"human and general conditionsl! and the "relevant questions of 
principle.,,7 Bonhoeffer advocates a system that includes facts 
as well as faith. But considering the demands of his theology 
and his Christological premise, it is questionable whether Bon-
hoeffer can make the natural and the rational to be morally rele-
vant wi~hout being inconsistent. For instance, if creation was 
completely perverted by the Fall, then nature does not express 
6These theological premises are not open to criticism by 
this paper except to request that they are not the only conclu-
sions that have been drawn from revelationo 
7Ethics, pe 248. 
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the will of God nor does it contain ethical norms evident to 
reason. 
The metaphysic that underlies Bonhoeffer's ethics is not 
articulated but it is seen by its effects to be a type of volun-
tarismo The ontological status of finite being is established 
only in God's volitional relation to it. There is no continuity 
of being between the Creator and the creature, only a void. One 
may not even speak of the relation of cause and effect in terms 
that would condition the absolute freedom of God. The freedom 
of God is not even limited by the historical Word of God. 8 The 
absolute distinction of God and the world is mediated by God's 
will actualized in Christ. Therefore the natural and the penul-
timate have an "analogy of relation" to the ground of all fini-
tude, i.e., God. 
The will of God through the Word of God can and does change 
through history; thus ethics must be free from absolute princi-
ples and norms to correspond to the present divine command. Yet, 
while professing the absolute freedom of God, and His changing 
will for man. Bonhoeffer also holds that the concept of poten-
tiality cannot be applied to God. ItThe introduction of the con-
cept of ~otentiality into the Christian idea of God represents a 
limiting of the divine omnipotence.,,9 It is difficult to see how 
God can change and yet be total act without any potentiality. 
8Act and Being, p. 81. 
9No Rusty Swords, po 32. 
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The will of God can change or there is a limitation to the divine 
freedom, but the will of God must not change or there is an actu-
alization of potency. This metaphysical difficulty with Bonhoef-
fer's notion of God reoccurs on the level of his ethical theory 
as a problem of how to give some content to morality. 
One's ethical duty is derived from God's absolute power to 
impose obligation. This position is a type of positivism, i.e., 
obligation is posited by the will of God. That the will of God 
is the only ethical norm is consciously held in Bonhoeffer's ear-
liest period. lO Karl Barth noted the positivistic quality of 
Bonhoeffer's moral theory. In 1931, Barth criticized Bonhoeffer 
for making Christ into an ethical principle and killing all other 
criteria. In Ethics, the concept of conformation shows Bonhoef-
fer's appreciation of the will of God as the sole determinant of 
goodness. Mants conformity with Christ is his only judgment of 
good or evil. Biblical positivism is indicative of the emphasis 
that Bonhoeffer gives the absolute freedom and power of God in 
his theology. The lack of absolute norms and principles is fully 
consistent with a voluntaristic notion of God. 
However, Bonhoeffer attempts to give a meaningful place to 
natural ~riteria in ethics. This addition of natural principles 
which are valid in their own right is simply not consistent with 
Bonhoeffer's voluntarism-positivism. Bonhoeffer's addition of 
lO"There are no actions which are bad in themselves." No 
Rusty Swords, po 44. "There cannot be good and evil as general 
ideas~ but only as qualities of will making decisions." Ibido, 
po 460 
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content to ethics by the notions of the natural, penultimate and 
the mandates constitutes a logical burden on his premises. Con-
sidering Bonhoeffer's Natural Theology and his Christology, it i 
difficult to attribute ethical significance to anything save the 
will of God. A series of quotations will serve to demonstrate 
that in Bonhoeffer's ethic, priority is given to formalism rathe 
than content. 
a) Content 
b) Form 
a) Content 
b) Form 
a) Content 
b) Form 
. 
• 
Bodily life, which we receive without any action 
on our own part, carries within itself the right 
to its own preservation. This is not a right that 
we have justly or unjustly appropriated to our-
selves, but it is in the strictest sense an "innate" 
right, one which we have passively received and 
which pre-exists our will, a right which rests upon 
the nature of things as they areo (Ethics, p. 155.) 
And here we are confronted with the fact that 
natural life does not possess its right in itself, 
but only in God. (Ethics, p. 168.) 
From its origin there is inherent in every thing 
its own law of being, no matter whether this thing 
is a natural object or a product of the human mind, 
and no matter whether it is a material or an ideal 
entity. (Ethics, p. 236.) 
The origin, essence and goal of all reality is the 
real, that is to say, God in Jesus Christ. (Ethics, 
po 2350) 
It is necessary in the given situation to observe, 
to weigh up, to assess and to decide, always within 
the limitations of human knowledge in general. One 
must risk looking into the immediate future; one 
must devote earnest thought to the consequences of 
one1s actions; and one must endeavor to examine 
one's own motives and one's own hearto (Ethics, 
p. 233. 
But because it was God who became man, it follows 
that responsible action, in the consciousness of 
the human character of its deCiSion, can never 
itself anticipate the judgment as to whether it 
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is in conformity with its or~g~n, its essence and 
its goals, but this judgment must be left entirely 
to Gode (Ethics, p. 2340) 
More sources could be cited but these are sufficient to show that 
every attempt of Bonhoeffer to give some intrinsic ethical value 
to the natural is futilee Content or metaphysical status of 
goodness and evil is not compatible with Bonhoeffer's positivism 
or with his voluntarism. Each effort to give ethical relevance 
to the penultimate is cancelled by the uncaused, un-conditioned 
freedom of the ultimatee How can nature have any ethical weight 
when it is neither a moral criterion nor per ~ good or bad? 
Rational deliberation and judgment on moral behavior are only the 
non-essential conditions of God's totally free acceptance or 
rejection. Consequently it is necessary to say that Bonhoeffer's 
attempt to give the world an ethical value is ineffective. The 
natural rights of the body, for instance, are inconsistent with 
the omni-present presupposition of justification by faith alone. 
The specifications and directives that Bonhoeffer does draw 
from the natural realm are based on the supposition that the 
natural form of life is both an end and a means. ll Rape, tor-
ture, etc., are "serious violations of the right which is given 
with the, creation of man. ,,12 However, a human right which is an 
end in itself is a denial of Bonhoeffer's own definition of the 
"natural" and the fact of Original Sin. The natural is that 
which serves the plan of God: it is a means. That any aspect of 
llEthics, p. 1500 
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the natural is an end in itself makes that aspect greater than 
the sum which is only preserved as a means to attain justifica-
tion and redemption by God. The fact that any right "given with 
the creation" still exists within the fallen world denies the 
anthropology on which Bonhoeffer built his ethics. Content is a 
systematic difficulty regarding Bonhoeffer's theological startin~ 
points. Moreover, this exposition of the natural as an end in 
itself and founded upon creational rights is an inconsistency 
even within Bonhoeffer's ultimate-penultimate distinction. 
Both in Bonhoeffer's definition of ethics and in his style 
of positivism there is a trace of provincialismo The truly ethi-
cal dimension is closed to the non-Christian and moreover, to an~ 
brand of Christianity that holds an analogy of being or an onto-
logical relationship to Godo Criticism of other ethical systems, 
theological and philosophical, is often accomplished with an 
unhealthy amount of generalization and stylization which is sim-
ply unfair to the complexity and detail of the individual's 
thought 013 Moreover, Bonhoeffer does not present his ethics 
with the purpose of convincing his readers of the truth value of 
his viewpoint. Bonhoeffer explicates an ethic for those who 
share h~ beliefso Even Christians who share Bonhoeffer's con-
cern for the determination of the will of God in their lives will 
find limited merit in the principle of conformation or the expla-
nation of the gospel commandments as self-evident in their 
13The reduction of philosophers into "pure" positions is ad-
mitted by Bonhoeffer! Act and Being, p. 19 and EthiCS, po 170 
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concrete proclamation. 
If the book [Ethics] is regarded as a working out of cer-
tain theological presuppositions, it has considerable 
merit, although evaluation of its consistency would still 
be a difficultyG But if it is regarded as a sustained 
argument for a certain viewpoint in ethics, it is dis-
appointing. 14 
Bonhoeffer benefitted from the failures of past ethical sys-
tems. He saw the immaturity fostered by reliance on principles. 
He interpreted a law as an appeal to action rather than a prohi-
bition. Bonhoeffer experienced the peripheral quality of ethical 
dilemma and onets psychological uncertainty concerning personal 
motiveso Bonhoeffer envisioned the social dimension of ethics 
and noted the absence of any absolute ethical authority among 
men. The ethical importance of the situation or context was evi-
dent to Bonhoeffero His Christian ethics was proposed as an 
alternative to the inaction and indecision fostered by weak ethi-
cal systems or ideologies. 
However, the Christian ethic of Bonhoeffer has no educative 
quality. It is a questionable guide for man's effort to deter-
mine beforehand the right or wrong of an intended course of ac-
tion. In the final analysis, the real moral judgment is made 
only by Godo Bonhoefferts ethics is labored by the juxtaposition 
. 
• 
of positivism and natural laws. There is a further lack of clar-
ity in the relationship of ends and means which Bonhoeffer dis-
cusses regarding the penultimate-ultimate distinctiono Even when 
14Rollo Handy, lIAn Analytic and a Dogmatic Ethics," The 
Review of Metaphysics, X, 4 (June, 1957), po 6960 
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his Christian premise is accepted, no meaningful method of deter-
mining the will and commandment of God is given by Bonhoeffer. 
In short, Dietrich Bonhoeffer's moral theology is more valuable 
for its criticism of other ethical systems, than for its positive 
achievement 0 
. 
. 
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